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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 35(c), Wickel states that he disagrees with 
Chamberlain's statement of the case and incorporates his own statement of the case, as set forth 
in the Appellant Brief, by reference. 
II. ARGUMENT 
The argument portion of this brief is separated into two sections: the Cross-Respondent 
Brief and the Appellant Reply Brief. There is a substantial amount of crossover among the issues 
raised by Chamberlain in his two appellate briefs. Where applicable, arguments made in one 
section, but applicable to another, are incorporated by reference. 
III. CROSS-RESPONDENT ARGUMENT 
A. The district court correctly determined that the local standard of practice in 
Idaho Falls was indeterminable. 
The local standard of practice in Idaho Falls was indeterminable. The relevant statutory 
language states: 
Such individual providers of health care shall be judged in such cases in comparison with 
similarly trained and qualified providers of the same class in the same community, taking 
into account his or her training, experience, and fields of medical specialization, if any. If 
there be no other like provider in the community and the standard of practice is therefore 
indeterminable, evidence of such standard in similar Idaho communities at said time may 
be considered. 
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1012 (2013 ). The Idaho Supreme Court has seldom interpreted the 
foregoing provision. The Idaho Supreme Court did interpret the language in Hoene v. Barnes, 
828 P.2d 315 (Idaho 1992). In Hoene, Monica Hoene went to Dr. Robert Barnes for a specific 
cardiovascular procedure. Id. at 316. '"At the time of Monica's[] surgery, Dr. Barnes was one of 
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only six cardiovascular surgeons in the state of Idaho." Id. at 317. "All six of these 
cardiovascular surgeons practiced together in Boise as a professional association." Id. The court 
reasoned that "unique circumstances" existed in Hoene. Id. As a consequence of those "unique" 
circumstances, the Hoene court held: 
Under the unique circumstances of this case, there was no provider of PDA surgery by a 
cardiovascular surgeon in Idaho other than Dr. Barnes and his colleagues who practiced 
as a professional association. Because these physicians all practiced together and were 
part of one business entity, we treat them as one provider under the statute. Therefore, we 
conclude under LC.§ 6-1012 that the standard ofhealth care practice in the community 
ordinarily served by St. Luke's was indeterminable. 
Id. This case replicates the facts and circumstances of Hoene. In this case, Chamberlain testified 
that to his knowledge only three doctors perform hemorrhoidectomies in Idaho Falls, Idaho using 
the PPH device. (R Vol. I, p. 166.) There is no evidence to dispute Chamberlain's testimony. In 
fact, Wickel accepts Chamberlain's representation as true: only three general surgeons in Idaho 
Falls use the PPH device for hemorrhoidectomies. There was no evidence presented on summary 
judgment that other doctors used the PPH device during 2010. The three doctors (Chamberlain, 
Dr. Baird, and Dr. Smith) are general surgeons who share office space and are associated 
together. (Id.) The doctors practice as an association: Idaho Falls Surgical Specialists. (Id.) 
Therefore, pursuant to Hoene, all three doctors are to be treated as a single health care provider. 
Hoene, 828 P.3d at 317. 
Consequently, the "Idaho Falls community standard of care" is indeterminable because 
there is only one health care provider who performs the procedure in the community. Id.; see also 
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1012. Since there is only one health care provider, Wickel was authorized 
to go outside ofldaho Falls and present evidence of a similar Idaho community standard of care. 
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Id Notwithstanding Chamberlain's testimony that the only general surgeons in Idaho Falls who 
use the PPH device for hemorrhoidectomies and the holding in Hoene, Wickel still attempted to 
find a general surgeon in Idaho Falls who would speak with Scoma about the Idaho Falls 
standard of care. (R Vol. I, pp. 106-108.) Obviously, he could not speak with Chamberlain or his 
partners. No other Idaho Falls based general surgeon was even willing to speak with Scoma 
when inquiries were made. (Id.) 
Jessica Wilson, a Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA paralegal, called physicians in Pocatello, 
Idaho for the same purpose. (Id.) None of the Pocatello physicians (a) used the PPH device or (b) 
were willing to speak with Scoma. (Id.) Because the Idaho Falls standard of care for this 
particular procedure is indeterminable, Scoma was entitled by law to go to a similar Idaho 
community to familiarize himself with that standard of care and to offer testimony and evidence 
about that standard. Hoene, 828 P.3d at 317; IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 6-1012. 
By appealing the district court's finding that the local standard was indeterminable, 
Chamberlain seeks to ignore his own testimony, the Wilson Affidavit, and Hoene. Chamberlain 
cites, Morris v. Thomson, 937 P.2d 1212, 1220-21 (Idaho 1997), for the proposition that Wickel 
"cannot establish the local standard of care by reference to similar communities until [the 
plaintiff] has demonstrated that the standard of care ... was indeterminable due to the absence of 
other health care providers in the community." (Cross-Appellant Br. pp. 17-18.) Chamberlain 
conveniently omits the language from ,Morris that immediately follows the cited portion that 
provides, "[the Plaintifl] has failed to establish that no other health care provider was practicing 
in Emmett at the time of Jessie's birth through which her expert could have familiarized 
Cross-Respondent Brief/ Appellant Reply Brief 3 
himself with the local standard of care." .Morris, 937 P.2d at 1221 (emphasis added). 
Here, Wickel established that his expert could not have familiarized himself with the 
standard of care in Idaho Falls based on Chamberlain's testimony that all of the providers who 
performed the procedure in question practiced with Chamberlain and Jessica Wilson's affidavit 
establishing that none of the general surgeons in Idaho Falls were willing to discuss the local 
standard of care with Scoma. By arguing that there were other general surgeons in the 
geographic region, Chamberlain ignores the undisputed fact that none of the general surgeons 
were willing to speak with Dr. Scoma or that they lacked knowledge of the standard of care for 
the performance of hemorrhoidectomies involving the PPH procedure. There was no way Scoma 
could have familiarized himself with the local standard of care by speaking with other general 
surgeons in Idaho Falls. 
This Court should not give Chamberlain's attempt to discredit Wilson's affidavit any 
credence. "[A]n issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal." Garner v. Bartschi, 80 P.3d 
1031, 103 7 (Idaho 2003 ). Chamberlain did not move to strike the affidavit below or seek to 
depose Jessica Wilson. As such, the affidavit is part of the record and should be included in its 
entirety. Thus, the district court correctly determined that the local standard of care in Idaho Falls 
was indeterminable. 
B. The local standard of care was indeterminable as to all issues. 
None of the general surgeons practicing in Idaho Falls agreed to speak with Scoma 
regarding the local standard of care. As such, the standard of care as to all issues was 
indeterminable. Chamberlain repeatedly argues that the record is devoid of any attempt on the 
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part of Scoma or Wickel to contact a general surgeon in Idaho Falls to discuss the standards 
relating to Chamberlain's various breaches. (Cross-Appellant Br. pp. 23-24.) These arguments 
ignore the plain language of Jessica Wilson's affidavit which provides: "I also inquired of the 
general surgeons' office whether the doctors would be willing to speak with Dr. Scoma about the 
local standard of care. They all declined to do so." (R Vol. I, p. 107 ( emphasis added) accord R 
Vol. I, p. 97.) Chamberlain's argument is completely and totally rejected by Wilson's testimony. 
\Vhether there were general surgeon's in Idaho Falls capable of testifying regarding 
Chamberlain's other breaches makes no difference here if none of them were willing to speak to 
Scoma as the record undisputedly establishes. Thus, the local standard of care was 
indeterminable as to all of Chamberlain's breaches. 
Alternatively, the issues are so intertwined that unless a consulted surgeon had performed 
surgeries using the PPH device he or she would be incapable of providing any opinion as to the 
local standard of care. For example, Scoma testified that Chamberlain "double-injured" Wickel. 
(R Vol. I, p. 98.) Review of Scoma's testimony establishes that the breaches of the standard of 
care cannot be neatly separated out as suggested by Chamberlain in light of the specialized 
procedure performed by Chamberlain. Chamberlain did not submit any evidence to the district 
court that any of the other general surgeons were familiar with the PPH procedure and how the 
performance of that procedure impacted, for example, the performance of an internal lateral 
sphincterotomy. Thus, Chamberlain's argument that Wickel failed to establish the standard of 
care as to Chamberlain's other breaches, should be rejected. 
Cross-Respondent Brief/ Appellant Reply Brief 5 
C. The district court correctly considered Scoma's Supplemental Affidavit on 
reconsideration. 
All of Chamberlain's arguments were mooted by Court's order remanding the appeal. The 
Court ruled that the July 30, 2013 "final" judgment was not a true judgment pursuant to Rule 54 
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. (Order Remanding to District Court at 1, October 28, 
2013.) Consequently, the "final" judgment was merely an interlocutory order. See Hon. Daniel T. 
Eismann, What is a Judgment?, at 10 (August 13, 2014); see also Boise Mode, LLC v. Donahoe 
Pace & Partners Ltd., 294 P.3d 1111, 1119 (Idaho 2013). At that point in the proceedings it 
became clear that Wickel never had to file a Rule 59(e) or 60(b) motion because there was no 
judgment to alter, amend, or from which he needed relief. The district court had the right to 
consider all of Wickel's evidence submitted with the Motion for Reconsideration, including 
Scoma's Supplemental Affidavit. See PHH }.Jortg. Servs. Corp. v. Perreira, 200 P.3d 1180, 1184 
(Idaho 2009); see also Agrisource, Inc. v. Johnson, -- P.3d --, *8 (Idaho 2014) (citing Kepler-
Fleenor v. Fremont Cnty., 268 P.3d 1159, 1162 (Idaho 2012)). 
Boise Afode, LLC's rationale does not apply to this case because no "final" judgment 
existed when Wickel filed for reconsideration. In Boise it1ode, LLC, there was a final judgment 
entered at the time of the reconsideration. Boise Af ode, LLC, 294 P.3d at 1115. Since the outcome 
in Boise Afode, LLC relied on the entry of a final judgment, it is distinguishable on its facts. 
InArregui v. Gallegos-kfain, 291 P.3d 1000 (Idaho 2012), the Court considered an 
affidavit from the plaintiff's expert submitted after the entry of judgment. Id. at 1003, 1008. If 
the Arregui district court properly considered the affidavit on reconsideration, then the district 
court in this case did not err in August 2013 by considering Scoma's Supplemental Affidavit. 
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D. A Rule 59(e) motion was not required because there was no Rule 58 judgment. 
Rule 59(e) motions are made to alter or amend a judgment. See IDAHO R. Civ. P. 59(e). 
The rule requires that a 59( e) motion be filed within fourteen days of entry of the judgment. Id. If 
there is no judgment, then there is nothing to alter or amend. As noted, supra, there was no 
judgment at the time of the Motion for Reconsideration. (Order Remanding to District Court at 
1.) Thus, there was nothing for Wickel to request the district court to alter or amend. 
E. The district court did not err by refusing to strike Scoma's Supplemental 
Affidavit. 
Chamberlain's Section D copies and pastes his arguments to the district court. Section D 
lacks any citation to legal authority; instead, the section contains misleading, unnecessary 
arguments and rhetorical questions that never reach the real issues in the case. 1 
1. The sham affidavit doctrine does not apply. 
Idaho has never adopted the sham affidavit rule. See Major v. Sec. Equip. Corp., 307 P.3d 
1225, 1231 (Idaho 2013) (citation omitted). The Major court wrote, "We have previously held 
that '[t]he issues of credibility should not be resolved at summary judgment unless the record is 
clear that credence cannot be given to the expert's affidavit."' Id. (citing 1\1ains v. Cach, 141 P.3d 
1090, 1094 (Idaho 2006)). In Mains, the district court struck the expert's affidavit because of 
apparent contradictory testimony. Alains, 141 P.3d at 1093. The Court reversed the district court 
in Alains. Id. at 1095-96. 
1 The admission of evidence is committed to the district court's discretion. Myers v. Workmen's Auto Ins. Co., 95 
P.3d 977, 987 (Idaho 2004). 
2 Since Chamberlain has chosen to just copy and paste his arguments before the district court for his Cross-
Appellant Brief, Wicket offers the following, modified quote from his prior briefing before the district court: 
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The }.fains court relied on Edmunds v. Kraner, 136 P.3d 338 (Idaho 2006), for its 
resolution of the }.fains appeal. The following excerpt from the }.fains decision is instructive: 
In Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 136 P.3d 338, this Court stated the following: 
Second, Idaho law specifically contemplates that expert testimony can change 
after the initial disclosure. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26( e )( 1 )(B) requires that 
litigants supplement discovery responses as to "the identity of each person 
expected to be called as an expert witness at trial, the subject matter on which the 
person is expected to testify, and the substance of the person's testimony." This 
Court has held that this rule "unambiguously imposes a continuing duty to 
supplement responses to discovery with respect to the substance and subject 
matter of an expert's testimony where the initial responses have been rejected, 
modified, expanded upon or otherwise altered in some manner." Clark v. Klein, 
137 Idaho 154, 157, 45 P.3d 810, 813 (2002) (quoting Radmer v. Ford Motor Co., 
120 Idaho 86,813 P.2d 897 (1991)) (emphasis added). In fact, litigants are subject 
to sanctions, including the exclusion of expert testimony, when they have failed to 
supplement an expert's opinion. See, e.g., Radmer, 120 Idaho at 91, 813 P.2d at 
902. 
142 Idaho at 874, 136 P.3d at 345. 
Edmunds is not directly on point, but it is instructive. It indicates that expert testimony 
may change and should not be discounted simply because it is different from prior 
testimony. See Kolin v. St. Luke's Reg'! Med. Ctr., 130 Idaho 323, 940 P.2d 1142 (1997), 
in which the expert referred to in the affidavit filed on behalf of the plaintiff denied 
providing any information regarding the standard of care to the plaintiff's expert. This 
Court held that the district court abused its discretion in holding that the affidavit did not 
raise genuine issues of fact sufficient to preclude summary judgment. Id. at 332-33, 940 
P.2d at 1151-52. The issues of credibility should not be resolved at summary judgment 
unless the record is clear that credence cannot be given to the expert's affidavit. 
Mains, 141 P.3d at 1094. Importantly, the evidentiary rules state that expert testimony may 
change at any time, even based on evidence presented at trial. See IDAHO. R. Evm. 703 (2013). 
Therefore, the Court should disregard Chamberlain's request to adopt the sham affidavit 
rule. The issues raised by Chamberlain go to the credibility of expert witnesses rather than the 
opinion's admissibility. Experts must be allowed the leeway afforded to them by the evidence 
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rules. Adopting the sham affidavit rule would unreasonably restrict an expert's ability to revise 
opinions as allowed for under the rules. 
The rule does not even apply. There is nothing in Scoma's affidavit that contradicts his 
deposition. The affidavit elaborates on his conversation with Schmid and can be read 
consistently with his deposition testimony. Any inferable inconsistencies should be left to a jury. 
Scoma testified during his deposition that he and Schmid discussed the standard of care for 
general surgeons performing hemorrhoidectomies and the PPH procedure. (R Vol. I, p. 195.) The 
initial affidavit explains that Scoma learned that Schmid is a general surgeon who performed the 
PPH procedure during 2010 in Twin Falls. (Id., p. 95-105.) The Supplemental Affidavit provided 
additional information about the conversation, including the manner in which Schmid performed 
PPH, his circumstances in Twin Falls, and that there were no deviations in Twin Falls from a 
national standard of health care practice. (R Vol. III, p. 420-22.) Chamberlain's argument that the 
two did not discuss the Twin Falls standard of care completely lacks merit. Scoma testified 
during his deposition that Schmid informed him that "there's no difference whether it be in Twin 
Falls, Idaho Falls, or anywhere else." (R Vol. I, p. 195.) 
At a minimum, Schmid had the capacity to familiarize Scoma with the Twin Falls 
standard of care because Schmid is a Twin Falls general surgeon who performed the PPH in 
Twin Falls during January 2010. The court has never required a consulting physician to provide 
foundation for admittedly hearsay statements to expert witnesses. IDAHO R. Evm. 703 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the doctors only discussed the standard of care generally 
for the performance of hemorrhoidectomies, there is still adequate foundation for the Twin Falls 
Cross-Respondent Brief/ Appellant Reply Brief 9 
standard of care, including Schmid's statement to Scoma that the standard in Twin Falls was 
harmonious with the national standard of care. The PPH procedure is a specialized method by 
which a general surgeon treats hemorrhoids. Schmid, as a general surgeon, treats hemorrhoids 
with PPH. Any discussion about the treatment of hemorrhoids would familiarize Scoma on the 
standard of care because Schmid has knowledge of the procedure. (R Vol. I, pp. 95-105.) 
The affidavit does not contradict the deposition testimony. Scoma testified: 
Q. Tell me what you remember you saying to Dr. Schmid. What did you tell him? 
A. I didn't tell him anything. It was just Dr. Schmid, I-I think we're talking about what 
the standard of care is for a general surgeon in Idaho doing a hemorrhoidectomy. And 
basically, you know, he says: The standard of care is the national standard o care. There's 
no difference whether it be in Twin Falls, Idaho Falls, or anywhere else. 
Q. Anything else you can remember specifically about that conversation? 
A. No. 
(R Vol. I, p. 195.) Both questions by Chamberlain's counsel were poor questions that left open 
the possibility that Scoma could, in the future, remember additional details about the 
conversation with Schmid. It also did not limit the conversation only to the information 
identified in lines nineteen through twenty-five of page seventy-one. The questions failed to ask 
for a recitation of the entire conversation or summary of the conversation. The affidavit was not a 
sham affidavit and the Court should decline to adopt the sham affidavit rule. 
2. The district court did not err by refusing to strike Scoma's Supplemental 
Affidavit. 
Schmid was never going to be a witness. Schmid acted as a local, consulting physician. 
There is no legal authority requiring or even allowing a local, consulting physician to testify at a 
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deposition or trial under these circumstances. Chamberlain fails to appreciate this and has cited 
no legal authority for what amounts to unreasonable demands for information from a local, 
consulting physician. He makes numerous criticisms of Scoma's testimony but each criticism is 
unsupported by the law and the facts. 
Idaho law allows an out of area expert to consult with a local specialist. See Perry v. 
Magic Valley Reg'! Afed. Ctr., 995 P.2d 816,821 (Idaho 2002). The local physician merely 
needs to be familiar with the specialty and procedure at issue during the relevant time period. 
See, e.g., Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Reg'! Med. Ctr., 45 P.3d 816,822 (Idaho 2002); Arregui, 291 
P.3d at 1005; Keyser v. Garner, 922 P.2d 409,415 (Idaho Ct. App. 1996). An expert witness 
may conclude that the local standard of care does not deviate from the national standard of care 
of his or her own volition after consulting a local physician. See Watts v. Lynn, 870 P.2d 1300, 
1305-06 (Idaho 1994). In Watts, the Idaho Supreme Court ruled that an expert affidavit saying 
that the expert (a) spoke with a local dentist and (b) that the expert was unaware of any 
deviations from the national standard of care, was admissible. Id. In fact, the cases do not even 
require that the local, consulting physician be trained in the same specialty as the defendant 
physician. See Suhadolnik v. Pressman, 254 P.3d 11, 17 (Idaho 2011); Hall v. Rocky Mountain 
Emergency Physicians, LLC, 312 P.3d 313, 319 (Idaho 2013) (noting that an expert does not 
need to be board-certified to testify against a board-certified defendant). 
Wickel submits that Scoma adequately familiarized himself with the standard of care in a 
similar Idaho community. For example, Scoma testified, "[Schmid] conveyed to me that there 
were no deviations in how he had been trained to use the PPH device in Twin Falls than 
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anywhere else." (R Vol. III, pp. 420-22.) The district court had evidence that the same Dr. Eyring 
who trained Chamberlain also trained Schmid on PPH. (R Vol. III, pp. 420-22.) As a general 
surgeon who was trained on the device, Schmid was eminently qualified to compare how he used 
the device in Twin Falls to what he learned in Salt Lake City. The law does not require that 
Schmid be trained at the same time as Chamberlain nor does it even require that Schmid have 
performed the PPH. See Suhadolnik, 254 P.3d at 17. The important inquiry is whether Schmid 
had knowledge of the standard of care during the appropriate time period. Scoma' s testimony 
establishes that Schmid would have used the device the same regardless of where he practiced 
and that the usage was uniform. The sentence also established that Schmid was familiar with the 
procedure that is the catalyst of the lawsuit. 
Schmid told Scoma that the standard of care in Twin Falls is a national standard of care. 
(R Vol. III, pp. 420-22.) As noted, supra, the law allows Scoma to decide for himself whether 
there are any deviations from the national standard of care. See Watts, 870 P.2d at 1305-06. 
Nothing precluded Schmid from telling Scoma that the standard was the national standard but it 
was not necessary for Schmid to explain why, how, or on what that statement was based. 
As noted, Schmid' s training is not relevant to his knowledge of the standard of care in 
light of the specialty he practices. The evidence established, and Chamberlain has never 
disputed, that (a) Schmid is a board-certified general surgeon; (b) Schmid practiced in Twin Falls 
during January 2010; and, (c) Schmid performed PPH with the Ethicon device during January 
2010. (R Vol. I, pp. 95-105; R Vol. III, pp. 420-22.) Section 6-1012's requirements are gauged 
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by site and time. See Watts, 870 P.2d at 1304. Additional details about Schmid's training are not 
necessary to meet the statute's requirements for admission of expert testimony. 
Indeed, the Arregui opinion appears to stand for the proposition that a plaintiff does not 
need to come forward with an incalculable amount of background information for the local, 
consulting physician. The problems in Arregui arose because the plaintiffs out-of-area expert 
consulted with a local chiropractor but never identified the chiropractor, never described the type 
of chiropractic practice the chiropractor ran, or how the chiropractor became familiar with the 
local standard of care for the treatment performed. Arregui, 29 I P .3d at 1008. This case is 
different because the district court had the information that the Arregui court lacked. The district 
court knew the local physicians name and practice areas. (R Vol. I, pp. 95-105; R Vol. III pp. 
420-22.) Schmid's familiarity with the unique procedure was disclosed. (R Vol. I, pp. 95-105.) 
Thus, Section 6-1012's requirements were met in Scoma's first affidavit. 
Scoma's testimony that "Dr. Schmid told me that in January 2010 there was nothing 
unique or special about the manner in which hemorrhoidectomies were performed with the PPH 
device" was entirely appropriate and admissible. (R Vol. III, p. 421.) As noted, supra, 
Chamberlain lacks legal authority establishing an abuse of discretion. Chamberlain's questions 
are, ultimately, irrelevant. 2 Without repeating prior arguments, Schmid knew how he performed 
2 Since Chamberlain has chosen to just copy and paste his arguments before the district court for his Cross-
Appellant Brief, Wicke! offers the following, modified quote from his prior briefing before the district court: 
The discussion in Chamberlain's brief ... is a variation of the old philosopher's ploy of reductio ad 
absurdum. Given the fact that there have been no modifications to the Ethicon PPH device since it was first 
marketed, the challenges to Scoma's opinion and his conversations with Schmid, are sophomoric attempt to 
obfuscate the obvious, that all three doctors were trained the same way, are instructed to follow the exact 
same usage guidelines, and, ideally, to use the device in the exact same way. What also gets lost in this 
discussion is the fact that all three doctors are board certified This means, at least in the eyes of the 
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PPH procedures in Twin Falls because he was the doctor who actually performed the procedures. 
It should be obvious, and was for the district court, that Schmid would know whether there was 
anything unique about how hemorrhoidectomies and PPH procedures are performed in Twin 
Falls because Schmid is the local specialist. 
It would be absurd if Idaho failed to recognize that local practitioners have knowledge 
about their respective medical specialties or practices. This Court's decision in Dulaney suggests 
that local physicians do possess inherent knowledge of the standard of care for their own 
specialties. In Dulaney, had the local, consulting physician actively practiced emergency 
medicine in August 1994, the case outcome would have been quite different. The Dulaney 
court's rationale for affirming the exclusion of the plaintiffs expert was an insufficiency of 
evidence showing the local physician's familiarity with emergency medicine, the medical 
specialty at issue. Id. at 822. This case is not Dulaney because Schmid is a board-certified 
general surgeon who personally knew the unique procedure employed to treat Wickel. 
Chamberlain argues that the district court erred in considering the following statement by 
Scoma. Scoma testified that Schmid told him that the "standard of care for general surgeons in 
Twin Falls would be the same regardless oflocation, i.e., that the standard of care in Twin Falls 
was a national standard as opposed to including any unique deviations from the national standard 
American Board of Surgery, that they all have equal knowledge and skills. In fact, not only is Schmid a 
board-certified general surgeon, he holds a PhD in addition to his MD. See 
http://www.vitals.com/doctors/Dr _Stephen_ Schmid html. 
There are serious policy considerations that are raised in light of Chamberlain's reductive requests for more 
information about the local physician. There is a real danger that if the Court were to ever require disclosure of the 
local physician's name, which it has not yet done, or allow the deposition of the local physician that medical 
malpractice lawsuits would become un-prosecutable due the chilling effect such a rule would have on an out of area 
expert's ability to acquire actual knowledge of the standard of care through consultation with a local physician. 
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of care." (R Vol. III, p 421.) Once more there is no rational argument advanced by Chamberlain 
explaining how the district court wrongly admitted the affidavit. 
Wickel argued the following to the district court and it is apt here: 
So long as the Court has that information, or that information is inferable from the 
evidence that it does have, then the Court should find that the expert has foundation. 
There are no other legal requirements, such as the seemingly endless laundry list of 
questions that Chamberlain has for Schmid. However, and to belabor this issue, those 
questions are irrelevant because Schmid is not the witness in this case and Scoma can 
rely on the inadmissible statements of third parties under Rule 703 of the Idaho Rules of 
Evidence. 
(R Vol. III, p. 510.) The district court did not err by admitting the Supplemental Affidavit. 
F. Scoma was familiar with the applicable standard of health care practice. 
Chamberlain's final set of arguments are somewhat duplicative of the arguments he 
makes in his Respondent Brief about Scoma's ability to testify about the national standard of 
care. In fact, most of Chamberlain's arguments in Section E repeat arguments he makes in 
various sections of his briefing. Wickel refers the Court to Sections III.E.2, IV.C and IV.E of this 
brief as his response to the arguments made by Chamberlain in Section E of his Cross-Appellant 
Brief. Wickel makes only a few observations in addition to those sections referred to above. 
First, Schmid is board certified and board certification is a national certification. He is a 
general surgeon who received training on PPH in Salt Lake City, Utah. His statements that the 
Twin Falls standard, and really the standard elsewhere in Idaho, are national standards are based 
on his experience. Yet, Schmid is just the local, consulting physician in the case. He does not 
need foundation for his statements to Scoma about the fact that the standard is a national 
standard other than his familiarity with the discipline at issue in the case. In fact, Scoma could 
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have, on his own, made the determination that there was no difference between the standards 
articulated by Schmid and the national standards. See Watts, 870 P.2d at 1306. 
Second, Scoma is board certified in general surgery and colorectal surgery. (R Vol. I, pp. 
95-105.) His curriculum vitae presented his qualification to opine as to the national standard of 
care. (Id.) Scoma's practice is based in San Diego, California. (Id.) He can compare the standard 
articulated by Schmid, and to some extent Chamberlain, with the standard in California. That 
creates a broader standard. Under Chamberlain's logic, there would be no way to establish a 
national standard unless the expert witness communicates with a physician in each of the states 
and its territories. Chamberlain's position is patently absurd and not supported by any authority. 
The district court had sufficient information before it establishing how Scoma determined 
that there were no deviations from the national standard of care. The Court should reject 
Chamberlain's arguments contained in Section E of his Cross-Appellant Brief. 
IV. REPLY BRIEF ARGUMENT 
A. Wickel did not waive his arguments under State v. Rubbermaid. 
Wicke! does not dispute that as the plaintiff he has the burden of proof establishing his 
claims against Chamberlain. As a non-moving party on a motion for summary judgment, 
however, his burden is substantially different than at trial. As this Court has repeatedly found, 
when a moving party fails to establish the absence of triable issues of fact on an element of a 
claim, then the non-moving party "has no burden to respond with supporting evidence." See 
Shelton v. Shelton, 225 P.3d 693,698 (Idaho 2009); see also Harwood v. Talbert, 39 P.3d 612 
(Idaho 2001); Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 887 P.2d 1034, 1038 (Idaho 1994); Heisler v. 
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Aletro. Council, 339 F.3d 622,631 (8th Cir. Minn. 2003). As noted in the Appellant Brief, 
Chamberlain's second motion for summary judgment raised just one issue: that Wickel lacked 
testimony about the Idaho Falls standard of care. (App. Br. p. 19.) The issue of similarity of 
communities was ancillary to the core decision that the Idaho Falls standard of care was 
indeterminable. Wicke! acknowledges that at trial he would have the burden of proof in showing 
a similar Idaho community's standard of health care practice pursuant to Idaho Code Section 6-
1012. The case was not dismissed as a result of a trial, though; instead, it was dismissed on a 
dispositive motion where Wicke! should have had no evidentiary burden because the district 
court rejected the fundamental premise of Chamberlain's motion. 
Deciding that the standard of care was indeterminable on summary judgment does not 
inherently require that the district court proceed to the next analytical step. The next step would 
have had to be raised either (a) during trial or (b) on a subsequent motion for summary judgment 
that actually argued and submitted evidence on the issue of whether Idaho Falls and Twin Falls 
were sufficiently similar communities. Chamberlain never filed such a motion and does not 
pretend to argue in his briefing that he ever raised the issue. Instead, Chamberlain's entire 
argument on appeal is an effort to have the Court shift the evidentiary burden to the non-moving 
party on issues not raised in the dispositive motion. 
In Rubbermaid, Rubbermaid raised causation as an issue for some of the State's claims. 
State v. Rubbermaid, 924 P.2d 615,617 (Idaho 1996). The State responded to the causation issue 
by arguing causation as to all of the claims asserted. Id. Thus, the issue of causation was fully 
briefed and was the sole issue on summary judgment. 
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This case is different because the issue on summary judgment was solely whether Wickel 
had evidence of a violation of the Idaho Falls standard of health care practice. (See App. Br. at p. 
19.) Wickel responded to the motion by arguing that he did not need to show a deviation from 
the Idaho Falls standard of health care practice because the Idaho Falls standard was 
indeterminable. (R Vol. II, pp. 196-224.) The district court agreed with Wickel, rejecting the sole 
issue raised by Chamberlain. (Id., pp. 405-13.) The district court should have refrained from 
analyzing whether Twin Falls and Idaho Falls are similar communities because such analysis 
was not necessary to the outcome of Chamberlain's motion. 
B. The district court erred by not hearing the Second Motion for Reconsideration. 
The July 2013 document entitled "Final Judgment" was merely an interlocutory order 
because it failed to comply with Rule 54(a). It was not a final judgment and should not have been 
afforded a final judgment's legal effects. One specific consequence of not complying with Rules 
54 and 58 is that the "final" judgment did not start the clock on Rule 1 l(a)(2)(B) motions for 
reconsideration. Rather than deciding Wickel' s Second Motion for Reconsideration on its merits 
the district court instead denied the motion based on incorrect jurisdictional analysis. The district 
court failed to properly apply the law because Idaho Appellate Rule 13 clearly empowers district 
courts to decide motions for reconsideration consistent with Rule 1 l(a)(2)(B) during the 
pendency of an appeal. 
Here, this Court remanded the appeal because the district court failed to enter a proper 
final judgment consistent with Rule 54(a). (Order Remanding to District Court at 1.) The 
document that had been entered in July 2013, as a consequence, was only an interlocutory order. 
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See Hon. Daniel T. Eismann, What is a Judgment?, at 10 (August 13, 2014). The district court 
entered a final judgment on October 31, 2013. Under Rule l l(a)(2)(B), Wickel had until fourteen 
days after the entry of the October 31, 2013 final judgment to file a motion for reconsideration 
with the district court. IDAHO R. CIV. P. 1 l(a)(2)(B). Wickel filed his Second Motion for 
Reconsideration on October 30, 2013, the day before final judgment was entered. (R Vol. III, pp. 
574-88.) Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 13(b)(7), the district court had jurisdiction to decide 
the Second Motion for Reconsideration notwithstanding the pendency of the appeal and the 
provisions of the Order Remanding to District Court. See IDAHO APP. R. 13(b)(7) (2013). 
Therefore, the district court's conclusion that the fourteen-day limit to file 
reconsiderations commenced on July 30, 2013 is clearly erroneous. Rule 1 l(a)(2)(B) clearly 
states that the time period for filing reconsiderations begins upon the entry of a final judgment. 
IDAHO R. CIV. P. l l(a)(2)(B). The fourteen-day period for filing reconsiderations should have 
started on October 31, 2013, the date the district court entered a proper final judgment. Wickel 
timely filed his Second Motion for Reconsideration and the district court should have heard the 
motion and considered Scoma's Second Supplemental Affidavit. See Agrisource, Inc. v. 
Johnson, --P.3d --, 2014 WL 4057145, *8 (Idaho August 18, 2014). 
Judicial error prejudices litigants all of the time. Indeed, the existence of the appellate 
process is predicated on ameliorating judicial error committed by lower courts. It is not Wickel's 
fault that the district court failed to enter a final judgment that complied with Rule 54(a).3 
3 Though the responsibility for proper entry of judgment rests with the court, the district court delegated the task of 
preparing the final judgment in July 2013 to counsel for Chamberlain. The district court signed the form prepared by 
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This case embodies what Justice Eismann described as one of the "significant 
consequences" of failing to follow Rule 54(a) and enter a final judgment. See Hon. Daniel T. 
Eismann, What is a Judgment?, at 13 (August 13, 2014). By failing to follow the rule, Wickel 
should have had another shot at a motion for reconsideration. Thus, the district court should have 
heard Wickel's Second Motion for Reconsideration and erred by refusing to do so. 
C. The district court erred by striking Scoma's first affidavit on summary 
judgment. 
Admissibility of evidence is a threshold issue even at summary judgment. See Weeks v. 
E. Idaho Health Servs., 153 P.3d 1180, 1183-84 (Idaho 2007). However, Wickel submits that 
when a district court has been presented with an expert's affidavit that sets forth adequate 
foundation, that as the non-moving party he should receive favorable inferences under Rule 
56(c). The district court struck Scoma's affidavit based on flawed legal analysis and a 
misunderstanding of who was the retained expert. Chamberlain's arguments made in his 
Respondent Brief do nothing to discredit the fact that Scoma talked with a local physician who 
practiced the same discipline as Chamberlain, during the relevant time period, and who 
performed the same, unique procedure that performed on Wickel. 
The test for admissibility of an expert's opinion is Rule 702 of the Idaho Rules of 
Evidence. Rule 702 provides that if the specialized knowledge possessed by the expert will assist 
the trier of fact, then the expert may testify "in the form of an opinion or otherwise." IDAHO R. 
Evm. 702 (2013). "The focus of the court's inquiry is on the 'principles and methodology' used 
Chamberlain's counsel. The so-called fault for preparing an infirm judgment rests squarely on the shoulders of 
Chamberlain and the district court. 
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not the conclusions they generate." Weeks, 153 P.3d at 1184. Idaho Code Section 6-1013 sets 
forth foundational requirements for experts in medical malpractice cases. See IDAHO CODE ANN. 
§ 6-1013 (2013).4 Section 6-1013 provides that only the experts must state how they became 
familiar with the standard of care. Id. It does not require that local, consulting physicians 
similarly explain how they became familiar with the applicable standard of care. 5 
Idaho law has long recognized that out of state experts may consult with local physicians 
to familiarize themselves with the applicable standard of health care practice for the relevant 
time and community. "A common means for an out-of-area expert to obtain knowledge of the 
local standard of care is by inquiring of a local specialist." Perry v. "Magic Valley Reg 'l Afed. 
Ctr., 995 P .2d 816, 821 (Idaho 2002). This Court has previously found that affidavits that simply 
state that the expert conferred with a local physician and was aware of no deviations from the 
national standard provided sufficient foundation for the expert's opinion under Section 6-1012. 
See Watts, 870 P.2d at 1306. 
A comparison of the evidence in Watts and this case repudiates Chamberlain's arguments 
that Wicke! did not produce sufficient factual background to satisfy Section 6-1013. In Watts, the 
plaintiff submitted the affidavit of Dr. Cohen, an out of area endodontist. Id. at 1302. Dr. 
Cohen's affidavit stated, in part: 
I have also familiarized myself specifically with the applicable community standards 
existing in 1984 in the Silver Valley, Idaho geographical community by discussing that 
subject with a dentist in general practice in Wallace, Idaho, who was also practicing in 
4 The only item at issue under Idaho Code Section 6-1013 is whether Scoma has "actual knowledge of the applicable 
standard to which his or her expert opinion is addressed." (R Vol. II, p. 411.) 
5 See footnote 2, supra. 
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Wallace, Idaho, during 1984. I confirmed that the standard of care of the practice of 
dentistry and the standard of care of endodontics for patients in the Wallace, Idaho, 
geographical community, as they existed in 1984, were the same as the national standards 
in the same areas of practice. I also confirmed with the local dentist that there were no 
deviations in the Silver Valley, Idaho geographical community in 1984 from the national 
standard of practice in the practice of dentistry and endodontics. 
Id. at 1302. The district court granted summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiffs experts 
"did not know the applicable standard of health care." Id. at 1303. The Idaho Supreme Court 
reversed the district court. Its rationale for reversing was explained thusly: 
[Idaho Code] § 6-1013 requires that the plaintiffs expert familiarize himself with the 
community standard. Dr. Cohen's affidavit stated that he did so and provided the factual 
background to support his familiarization. That the trial court found Dr. Branz' affidavit 
more truthful or convincing involves issues of weighing facts, which are not to be 
considered as the basis for a grant of summary judgment. 
Id. at 1305. The Watts Court continued: 
In this case, the sworn statement of Dr. Cohen, taken as true, is sut1icient to qualify him 
to express an expert opinion relative to the local standard of care and whether or not it 
was adhered to by Lynn, at least for purposes of summary judgment. Dr. Cohen stated in 
his affidavit that he familiarized himself with community standards for the relevant time 
period by conferring with a local dentist and was aware of no deviation from national 
standards. This statement comports with the requirements ofl.C. § 6-1013 and this 
Court's prior holdings under that section. Kozlowski v. Rush, 121 Idaho 825, 828 P.2d 854 
(1992); Clarke, 114 Idaho at 766, 760 P.2d at 1182. Accordingly, we hold that the trial 
court erred when it rejected Dr. Cohen's affidavit as insufficient. 
Id at 1306 (internal citations and footnotes omitted). 
Here, paragraph five of Scoma' s affidavit is, at the very least, similar to Dr. Cohen's 
affidavit in Watts. It complied with the Section 6-1013's requirements. Scoma testified: 
I have actual knowledge of the applicable community standard of care to which my 
expert opinions are addressed. My knowledge comes from my experience and training, 
as well as the deposition transcript of Dr. David Chamberlain, the medical records that I 
have reviewed, and the guidelines for use of the PPH device as promulgated by Ethicon 
Endo-Surgery, Inc. In addition, I have spoken with a general surgeon in Twin Falls, 
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Idaho, Stephen Schmid, M.D., who performed hemorrhoidectomies using the PPH device 
in 2010. I have discussed the applicable community standard of care with Dr. Schmid 
and based on that conversation, my experience, training, review of the medical records, 
affidavits, depositions, and documentation, I have determined that the community 
standard of care does not deviate from the national standard of care and that, in fact, the 
national standard of care had supplanted any local standard of care as of 2010. 
Physicians in Idaho practiced in conformance with the national standard of care in 2010. 
(R Vol. I, pp. 96-97.) Scoma testified that he reviewed the deposition of Dr. Chamberlain for 
purposes of the Idaho Falls standard of care.6 He also testified that he consulted with a Twin 
Falls general surgeon who performed PPH during the relevant time period and based on that 
conversation Scoma was able to determine that the Twin Falls standard of care did not deviate 
from the national standard of care. (Id.) Scoma's testimony is similar to Cohen's testimony in 
Watts. Both stated how they acquired actual knowledge of the community standard of health care 
practice. Both witnesses complied with Section 6-1013. The Court should reverse the district 
court's decision to strike the March 22, 2013 affidavit. 
Importantly, Chamberlain never challenged Schmid's familiarity with the Twin Falls 
standard of care. Chamberlain argued that Schmid did not have knowledge of the Idaho Falls 
standard of care but that issue became moot when the district court found that the Idaho Falls 
standard was indeterminable. Thus, this case is unlike Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Nfedical Center, 
45 P.3d 816 (Idaho 2002). In Dulaney, there was a significant dispute over whether the local, 
consulting physicians had actual knowledge of the relevant standard of health care practice 
because neither of the local, consulting doctors practiced emergency medicine, which was the 
6 Chamberlain testified that the Idaho Falls standard of care would be "what general surgeons in my situation under 
similar circumstances would have done." (R Vol. I, p. 170-71.) Arguably, Schmid and Scoma both qualify as 
general surgeons who operate on patients in similar circumstances and could opine as to the standard of care based 
solely on Chamberlain's description of how one would ascertain the standard of care. 
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relevant medical discipline in the case, in Boise, Idaho, during the relevant time period. Dulaney, 
45 P.3d at 823-24. Here, there is no dispute whether Dr. Schmid practiced general surgery (the 
relevant discipline) during the relevant time period (2010) in a similar Idaho community (Twin 
Falls). (See R Vol. I, pp. 96-97; 153-57.) 
Chamberlain repeatedly cites Ramos v. Dixon, 156 P.3d 533 (Idaho 2007), for the 
proposition that "there must be evidence showing that the Idaho physician knows the applicable 
standard of care." Id. at 538. In Ramos, the Court relied on its decision in Dulaney for that 
proposition. Id. Wickel has already briefed the distinctions between this case and the facts in 
Dulaney. (Appellant Br. at 28-29.) In Dulaney, neither of the consulting physicians actually 
practiced emergency medicine. Dulaney, 45 P.3d at 820-24. Here, the evidence showed that 
Schmid (a) practiced general surgery in 2010, (b) performed PPH in 2010, and (c) performed 
hemorrhoidectomies in 2010. (R Vol. I, pp. 95-105.) Therefore, Schmid had knowledge of the 
standard of care that he was describing to Scoma. If Schmid were a pediatrician during 2010, 
then Dulaney, Ramos, and their multitudinous progeny might apply. But those cases do not 
apply. And once the district court found the Idaho Falls standard of care to be indeterminable, 
Chamberlain's arguments about Idaho Falls became immaterial. 
Chamberlain's arguments related to the Arregui decision lack any merit. All of the 
information that the Arregui court required exists in this case. Chamberlain describes the 
evidence before the district court as "bare bones statements" and suggests that they are 
insufficient. (Respondent Br. at 11.) Chamberlain completely fails to address the actual 
substance of the evidence before the district court on summary judgment. The district court had 
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the local physician's identity, the type of practice, familiarity with the procedure at issue, and 
that the local practitioner performed the relevant procedure during the relevant time period. (R 
Vol. I, pp. 96-97.) Schmid told Scoma that nothing about performing PPH in Twin Falls, Idaho 
Falls, or anywhere in Idaho deviated from the national standards. (Id.) Chamberlain has cited the 
Court to absolutely no authority requiring local physicians to provide anything more than their 
opinion about the local standard of care. 
Chamberlain argues that the Court should not take Scoma's statement that he is familiar 
with the national standard of care at face value without more of an evidentiary showing. 
Chamberlain's arguments are misplaced because he is arguing about the weight or credibility of 
the witness as opposed to the admissibility of the evidence itself. In Watts, the district court was 
criticized, and reversed, for improperly weighing Dr. Cohen's testimony and not giving all 
favorable inferences to the plaintiff. Watts, 870 P.3d at 1305. District courts simply should not 
consider or weigh the opinions offered by a qualified expert witness. Weeks, 153 P.3d at 1184 
(stating that the focus of the admissibility inquiry is the principles and methodologies rather than 
the conclusions generated). Moreover, the information before the district court clearly 
established Scoma's bonajides to opine as to the national standard of care. Wickel submitted 
Scoma's curriculum vitae as an attachment to his affidavit. (R Vol. I, pp. 95-105.) The CV 
identifies his national credentials as a board certified general surgeon and colorectal surgeon. 
(Id.) So long as Scoma can base his opinion that there was no deviation from the national 
standard of care on his conversation with the local practitioner, there is adequate foundation. 
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Scoma's first affidavit satisfied the foundational requirements of Idaho Code Section 6-
1013. The affidavit stated how he became knowledgeable about the applicable standard of care. 
The district court erred by striking the affidavit. Contrary to the district court's conclusion, 
Scoma had not familiarized himself with the standard of health care practice by consulting with a 
general surgeon and reviewing Chamberlain's deposition. 
D. The district court erred in finding that Wickel did not submit evidence 
generating triable issues that Twin Falls and Idaho Falls are similar communities. 
Chamberlain's arguments on the issue of similarity ofidaho communities miss the mark 
on all counts. Chamberlain's arguments are largely irrelevant to how courts should decide 
whether Idaho communities are similar. Significantly, Chamberlain does not adequately address 
Wickel's arguments that statistical or demographic information are not the true means by which 
similarity of communities should be established. Unfortunately, there are no Idaho cases directly 
addressing the issue; however, the Illinois Appellate Court's decision in Weekly v. Solomon, 510 
N.E.2d 152 (Ill.App. 1987), provides more guidance on the issue than any of the Idaho cases that 
Chamberlain tries to shoehorn in by analogy. The Weekly court wrote: 
'Similar locality' is defined in terms of the medical conditions and facilities available to 
the physician. In Purtill v. Hess, [489 N.E.2d 867 (Ill. 1986)] the court noted that the 
similar locality rule requires comparison of the available medical facilities for 
examination and treatment, the presence or absence of specialists and other medical 
personnel for consultation and assistance, and other variables. 
Id. This standard makes sense because the entire purpose ofidaho Code Sections 6-1012 & 1013 
is to define how a plaintiff can prove the community standard of health care practice in 
malpractice cases. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § § 6-1012 & 1013. Once a district court rules that the 
standard of care is indeterminable, plaintiffs may submit evidence "of such standard in similar 
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Idaho communities" in the case. Id. The only way to evaluate whether one community is similar 
to another vis-a-vis the standard of care is based on medical conditions and facilities available to 
the physician, as noted in Weekly. The size of a community, the median age of a community, and 
other statistical factors, though interesting, are not really relevant to determining whether a 
community is similar for standard of care purposes. Comparing the facilities, the specialists, and 
other medical variables have far more bearing on whether communities are similar.7 
In this case, the district court twice had the'opporturi.ity to correctly rule that there were 
triable issues of fact whether Twin Falls and Idaho Falls were similar. Scoma's first affidavit 
provided the district court with the following evidence: (1) Twin Falls has at least one general 
surgeon practicing in the community; (2) the general surgeon performed hemorrhoidectomies in 
2010; and, (3) the PPH procedure was performed in Twin Falls during 2010. (R Vol. I, pp. 95-
105.) The two communities had the same class of health care providers present in them. The two 
communities had the same care options available to them: hemorrhoidectomies via PPH. The 
district court should have inferred that there were adequate facilities for PPH procedures in Twin 
Falls based on the fact that PPH procedures were performed in Twin Falls. Chamberlain testified 
that the PPH was a procedure performed in a hospital. (R Vol. I, p. 160.) The district court should 
have inferred that there were adequate, comparable hospital facilities in Twin Falls based on 
Chamberlain's testimony and Scoma's affidavit. The district court should have inferred that there 
7 To use a pop culture reference that is somewhat dated, there could be Doc Hollywood scenarios throughout Idaho 
where a highly trained, world-class physician chooses to remain in a small, parochial township. The medical care 
received by the residents of the hamlet would be world class even if there were pigs sleeping on the front porch of 
the clinic. Whether one community is similar to another turns not on demographics but whether the type of care is 
provided in both communities. 
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were comparable health care practitioners in both communities because there were general 
surgeons in both cities. In short, Scoma's affidavit submitted evidence into the record that the 
district court should have relied upon to decide that there were triable issues of fact as to the 
issue of similar communities. Scoma's Supplemental Affidavit also generates the triable issues of 
material fact on similarity of the two communities. 
In Section E of his Respondent Brief, Chamberlain poses several questions that are 
entirely irrelevant. It does not matter how many general surgeons practice in Twin Falls versus 
Idaho Falls. It does not matter how many of those surgeons performed PPH. Chamberlain's 
arguments are just hollow words and are not based on any legal authority. In fact, Wickel 
suggests that Chamberlain relies on no relevant authority in Section E of the Respondent Brief. 
What does matter is that Scoma's affidavits contain evidence that establishes similarity of the 
two communities or at the very least the affidavits generate triable issues of material fact. 
E. The district court erred by not applying a national standard of care. 
Scoma testified that there were no deviations from the national standard of care. (R Vol. I, 
pp. 95-105.) He based this opinion on his conversation with an Idaho general surgeon who 
performed the same procedure as Chamberlain. (Id.) Scoma's actions were entirely consistent 
with and authorized by Idaho Code Section 6-1012 and the case law interpreting the statute. See, 
e.g., Watts, 870 P.2d at 1306; see also Kozlowski v. Rush, 828 P.2d 854 (1992). 
In cases where health care practitioners voluntarily hold themselves out to a national 
standard, whether that is through board certification or otherwise, the relevance of the locality 
rule is dubious. Wickel recognizes that it is within the province of the legislature to enact laws; 
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however, it is this Court's province and privilege to "say what the law is." Marbury v. Madison, 5 
U.S. 137 (1803). There was a time where the Court in fact applied a national standard of care for 
board certified physicians. Buck v. St. Clair, 702 P.2d 781 (Idaho 1985), abrogated by Grimes v. 
Green, 7 46 P.2d 948 (Idaho 1987). The Buck court limited the application of the national 
standard only to board certified physicians. Id. at 783. The Buck court explained: 
Our reasons for this decision are simple: board-certified medical specialists are highly-
trained individuals who become certified after completing a rigorous training program. 
Medical schools are accredited by a national team of physicians and administrators. The 
residency training programs are approved by a single board of specialists, and a physician 
is certified as a specialist only after passing a nationally administered exam consisting of 
both oral and written components. The board-certified specialists practicing within the 
state are the product of nationally designed education programs. The standard of care 
familiar to any board-certified physician in this state is a national standard of care. We 
see no reason to believe there is local standard of care which deviates from the national 
standard of care for board-certified physicians. Our ruling today is limited to board-
certified doctors practicing in the same area of specialty. Hence, a board-certified 
physician can testify only against another board-certified physician practicing in the same 
area of medicine: surgeons against surgeons; obstetrician-gynecologists against 
obstetrician-gynecologists, anesthesiologists against anesthesiologists, and so forth. Our 
holding is to be construed so as to allow a board-certified physician to testify regarding 
the standard of care only in cases involving other doctors who are also board-certified in 
the same specialty. 
Id. The Court continued: 
Moreover, the legislature was concerned with the disparity between urban and rural areas 
in terms of availability of medical facilities, education programs, and other specialists 
when it passed LC.§§ 6-1012 and 6-1013. And rightfully so for general practitioners and 
other physicians who do not hold themselves out as board-certified specialists. Our 
holding today does not impair the protections inherent in LC.§§ 6-1012 and 6-1013 for 
these types of physicians. For a general practitioner it is inherently unfair to compare him 
or her against a board-certified specialist or against a general practitioner who may have 
available in another area highly sophisticated equipment and technology. However, for 
those doctors who have elected to specialize, who profess to be specially trained to 
practice in a particular area of medicine, and who hold themselves out to the public as 
nationally board-certified specialists, there can be no doubt that any disparity between 
rural and urban areas has been erased by the standardized training these doctors receive. 
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See Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102,235 N.E.2d 793 (1968);Ardoline v. Keegan, 140 
Conn. 552, 102 A.2d 352 (1954); McGulpin v. Bessmer, 241 Iowa 1119, 43 N.W.2d 121 
(1950). 
Id. at 784. The rationale makes sense and was timely in 1985 when the Idaho Supreme Court 
wrote it. The comments are apropos in the twenty-first century. 
In 1987, the Court retreated from the foregoing language in Buck in a sharply divided 3-2 
decision in Grimes v. Green, 7 46 P.2d 978 (Idaho 1987). The Court ruled: 
Plaintiffs-respondents argue in effect, that in cases alleging malpractice of board-certified 
physicians, Buck establishes a national standard by which the actions of all such 
physicians will be gauged and measured, and hence there can be no local deviation from 
such a national standard. Such argument ignores the clear mandate of LC. § 6-1012. In 
fairness to the trial court and counsel in the instant case, we perceive some of the 
language of Buck as lending some support to respondents' assertions. However, that 
language is dicta, was not necessary to the narrow holding of Buck, i.e., the competence 
of a witness to testify, and we now disavow that dicta. 
Grimes v. Green, 746 P.2d at 980-81. 
Wickel does not suggest that there cannot be local deviations from a national standard 
even in cases involving a board certified physician. However, from an evidentiary perspective, a 
defendant's board certification should be an admission against interest that the standard of care in 
the physician's specialty has been replaced by a national standard of care. An expert should be 
allowed to rely on the board certification to satisfy the requirements of Section 6-1013. The onus 
would then be on the defendant physician to demonstrate any deviations from the national 
standard. Under such a scenario, the purposes ofldaho Code Sections 6-1012 & 1013 would be 
satisfied and medical malpractice would more accurately reflect reality. Wickel is not asking the 
Court to do the legislature's job; instead, Wickel is asking the Court to "say what the law is" and 
interpret the operative statutes in a way that is practical and reality based. 
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This case is especially ripe for such a determination. Chamberlain testified that in using 
the PPH instrument and performing hemorrhoidectomies, he has not deviated from the training 
he received in Salt Lake City, Utah, in 2002. (R Vol. I, p. 161.) Chamberlain said he would 
perform PPH "the same in any of my patients that [he] treats" and that the facilities available to 
him did not require him to modify his performance of the procedure in any way. (Id., pp. 161-62.) 
Chamberlain is board certified. The PPH procedure was not performed any differently in Idaho 
Falls than it would have been anywhere else. There is no evidence of any deviation from the 
national standard of care. Scoma reviewed Chamberlain's deposition and spoke with Schmid 
about the standard of care. (Id., pp. 95-105 .) Scoma, therefore, had foundation to opine as to both 
the Idaho Falls standard of care and the Twin Falls standard because they were both consonant 
with a uniform, national standard of care. 8 
F. The district court erred dismissing the entirety of Wickel's case. 
The district court erred when it dismissed all of Wickel's case because it found that the 
standard of care in the Idaho Falls community was indeterminable. At that point there had been 
no showing by Chamberlain that required dismissal of the case. This was due to the fact that 
Chamberlain's motion was of an extremely limited scope, as discussed in prior briefing. 
There were triable issues of fact on the informed consent claim that should have 
prevented summary judgment from being entered. There are only three elements to an informed 
consent claim: nondisclosure, causation, and injury. Sherwood v. Carter, 805 P.2d 452,461 
8 Not to mention the fact that Chamberlain's own expert witness, Dr. James Olson, offered evidence that the 
performance of the PPH by Chamberlain was not within the course of treatment he would have recommended and 
that Wickel's pain was associated with the placement of the staple from the PPH. (R Vol. I, pp. 180-81 .) 
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(Idaho 1991). This case does not involve a situation where the doctor discussed the risks of the 
procedure with the patient. This is a case where it is undisputed that the doctor unilaterally, and 
without discussion with the patient, decided to perform a separate procedure on a patient who 
was under anesthesia at the time. (App. Ex. 2, pp. 714-16.) Wickel was never afforded an 
opportunity to be "aware" of the risks associated with the procedure, as required by Section 39-
4506. Chamberlain made the choice for Wickel. There is no factual dispute whether Chamberlain 
failed to disclose the risks, benefits, or nature of the procedure. He completely failed to do so. 
Therefore, it was error for the district court to dismiss Wickel's entire case. 
V. CONCLUSION 
As a result of the foregoing, the district court erred by dismissing Wickel's case. This 
Court should reverse the district court and remand for trial on the merits. 
DATED: September 10, 2014 
John ondet 
Of Be St. Clair Gaffney PA 
Attorneys for the Appellant/Cross-Respondent 
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What Is A Judgment? 
A. WHAT IS A JUDGMENT? 
Hon. Daniel T. Eismann 
August 13, 2014 
1. Prior to 2010. In 2009, the rules that set forth the requirements for a judgment were 
Rules 54(a) and (c) and 58(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 54(a) stated: 
"'Judgment' as used in these rules includes a decree and any order from which an appeal lies. A 
judgment shall not contain a recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior 
proceedings." Rule 54(c) included the requirement that "every final judgment shall grant the 
relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled." Rule 58(a) included the 
statement, "Every judgment shall be set forth on a separate document." 
The Idaho Supreme Court has, in the past, contributed to the confusion of what 
constitutes a judgment. For example, in Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637, 991 P.2d 362 (1999), 
the Court held that an order granting the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment was a final 
judgment because if an order "ends the suit, adjudicates the subject matter of the controversy, 
and represents a final determination of the rights of the parties, the instrument constitutes a final 
judgment." Id. at 640-41, 991 P.2d at 365-66. However, the Court had earlier held that an order 
granting a motion for summary judgment which stated that "[p]laintiffs complaint is dismissed 
with prejudice" was not a judgment because it did not comply with the separate-document 
requirement of Rule 58(a). Hunting v. Clark Cnty. School Dist. No. I 61, 129 Idaho 634, 637, 
931 P.2d 628, 631 ( 1997). In addition, in Davis, the Court held that the order granting the 
plaintiffs' motion for summary was a final judgment, even though the trial court did not 
expressly dismiss or rule upon the defendant's counterclaim, because all issues raised in the 
counterclaim were resolved by the grant of summary judgment to the plaintiffs. 133 Idaho at 
640-41, 991 P.2d at 365-66. In Skaggs v. Mutual of Enumclaw Insurance Co., 141 Idaho 114, 
106 P.3d 440 (2005), the Court held that a five-page "Decision and Order'' which concluded with 
the words "It is so ordered" was a final judgment. In those cases, the Court focused upon 
whether it was clear that the district court's decision resolved all of the issues in dispute rather 
than whether the document complied with Rules 54(a) and (c) and 58(a). 
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Focusing solely upon whether the trial court had rendered a decision that, when 
examined, will resolve the issues in the case can lead to confusion as to the time limit for filing 
motions that must be filed within a specified time after the entry of judgment or for filing an 
appeal. For example, in Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co., Ltd., 137 Idaho 850, 55 P.3d 304 (2002), 
the district court orally granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment during a hearing 
held on November 16, 1999. Id. at 855, 55 P.3d at 309. Partial judgments had already been 
entered on all of the other claims for relief in the lawsuit. Id. at 867-68, 55 P.3d at 320-21. At 
the conclusion of the hearing, the court instructed defendant's counsel to prepare the appropriate 
order and a judgment. Id. at 868 n.12, 55 P.3d at 322. Defendant's counsel prepared the order, 
which was filed on November 24, 1999, and he filed a memorandum of costs on December 8, 
1999. Id. at 866, 55 P.3d at 320. After an objection that the memorandum did not comply with 
Rule 54(d)(5), he filed an amended memorandum of costs on December 22, 1999, which the 
district court held was untimely because it was not filed within fourteen days of the entry of the 
judgment (the order granting summary judgment). Id. Thus, the district court told counsel to 
prepare both an order granting the motion for summary judgment and a judgment. Counsel only 
prepared the order, and the court later held that the order constituted the judgment. This is an 
example of the confusion that can be created without a clear definition of what constitutes a 
judgment. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the memorandum of costs was not untimely 
because the order granting summary judgment was not a judgment. Id. at 868, 55 P.3d at 322. 
2. Change in Rule 54(a) in 2010. In 2010, the Court amended Rule 54(a) to clarify 
what constituted a judgment. The Rule that became effective on July 1, 2010, provided as 
follows: 
"Judgment" as used in these rules means a separate document entitled 
"Judgment" or "Decree". A judgment shall state the relief to which a party is 
entitled on one or more claims for relief in the action. Such relief can include 
dismissal with or without prejudice. A judgment shall not contain a recital of 
pleadings, the report of a master, the record of prior proceedings, the court's legal 
reasoning, findings of fact, or conclusions of law. A judgment is final if either it 
has been certified as final pursuant to subsection (b)(l) of this rule or judgment 
has been entered on all claims for relief, except costs and fees, asserted by or 
against all parties in the action. 
The rule set forth these requirements for a document to be a judgment. 
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(a) A judgment must be a separate document. A judgment must be a "separate 
document." The separate-document requirement was not new. Rule 58(a) already stated, "Every 
judgment shall be set forth on a separate document." That requirement had been added to Rule 
58(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure in 1992. Hunting, 129 Idaho at 637,931 P.2d at 631. 
The 2010 amendment to Rule 54(a) took the separate-document requirement from Rule 
58(a) and incorporated it in Rule 54(a) in order to have all the requirements for a judgment in 
one rule. "The purpose of this rule is to eliminate confusion about when the clock for an appeal 
begins to run. The separate document requirement was also designed to eliminate uncertainty 
over what actions of the district court are intended to be its judgment." Spokane Structures, Inc. 
v. Equitable Inv., LLC, 148 Idaho 616, 619, 226 P.3d 1263, 1266 (2010) (quoting 46 Arn. Jur. 2d 
Judgments§ 70 (2006) (footnotes omitted)). 
For the judgment to be a separate document, the document must do only one thing-set 
forth the judgment to be entered. A document that begins with the court's decision granting the 
Defendant's motion for summary judgment and concludes with the words "Plaintiffs complaint 
is dismissed with prejudice" is not a judgment because the words dismissing the complaint were 
not on a separate document. Hunting, 129 Idaho at 637, 931 P.2d at 631. A document titled 
"Amended Judgment of Dismissal with Prejudice" was not a separate document as required by 
Rule 54(a), and therefore not a judgment, where the document included an order denying the 
Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration. Estate of Holland v. Metro. Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co., 153 
Idaho 94, 99, 279 P.3d 80, 85 (2012). In Bald, Fat & Ugly, LLC v. Keane, 154 Idaho 807, 303 
P.3d 166 (2013), an order confirming an arbitration award did not constitute a judgment because 
of the documents attached to it. "As this Court had previously explained, the separate-document 
requirement prohibits combining a judgment with a decision or order, including an order upon 
which the judgment is based." Id. at 809, 303 P.3d at 168. 
That should not be read as precluding attachments to a judgment. It depends upon what 
the attachments are. As explained below, the attachments cannot be documents that contain 
anything that cannot be included in a judgment, such as a recital of pleadings, the report of a 
master, the record of prior proceedings, the court's legal reasoning, findings of fact, or 
conclusions of law. However, other documents could be attached such as a legal description of 
the property in a judgment in a quiet title action or the list of property awarded to a party in a 
divorce action. 
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(b) A judgment must be titled "Judgment" or "Decree." To be a judgment, 
the document must be titled "Judgment" or "Decree." The purpose of this requirement is to 
make it clear that the document is a judgment. A document titled "ORDER TER.i\1INA TING 
PARENTAL RIGHTS AND GRANTING ADOPTION OF MINOR CHILD" could not 
constitute a judgment because it was not titled "Judgment" or "Decree." Doe v. Doe, 155 Idaho 
660,663, 315 P.3d 848, 851 (2013). However, merely titling a document "Judgment" will not 
make it a judgment if it does not otherwise comply with Rule 54(a). Harrison v. Certain 
Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 149 Idaho 201,205,233 P.3d 132, 136 (2010). 
The title need not be limited to the words "Judgment" or "Decree." For example, a 
document titled "Amended Judgment" would comply with the rule. However, the Supreme 
Court has not had occasion to address the scope of this requirement. It would not be prudent to 
have a title such as, "Judgment Based Upon the Granting of the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment That Was Argued on March 14, 2014, and Decided By This Court By a Written 
Opinion Filed on April 8, 2014." Although that may seem like a ridiculous example, this Court 
has seen similarly ridiculous actions by judges seeking to circumvent other provisions of Rule 
54(a). 
(c) A Judgment Shall State The Relief. The requirement that a judgment must 
"state the relief to which a party is entitled on one or more claims for relief in the action" was 
already included in Rule 54( c ). That rule included the requirement that "every final judgment 
shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party 
had not demanded such relief in his pleadings." I.R.C.P. 54(c) (2009). That requirement was 
also incorporated in Rule 54(a) so that the latter rule would include all of the requirements of a 
judgment. 
The relief to which a party is entitled must be the relief to which the party is entitled in 
the lawsuit on a claim for relief. That is why an order granting summary judgment cannot 
constitute a judgment. "The granting of the motion for summary judgment is simply a 
procedural step towards the party obtaining that relief." Spokane Structures, 148 Idaho at 619, 
226 P.3d at 1266. "The relief to which a party is entitled is not the granting of a motion for 
summary judgment. The Rule refers to the relief to which the party is ultimately entitled in the 
lawsuit, or with respect to a claim in the lawsuit." Id. 
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The relief to which a party is entitled must be read in connection with Rule 8(a)(l) of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. That rule provides, "A pleading which sets forth a claim for 
relief ... shall contain ... (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 
entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself 
entitled." I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l). "The 'demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself 
entitled' obviously refers to the relief that the party seeks in the lawsuit." Spokane Structures, 
148 Idaho at 619, 226 P.3d at 1266. "The relief to which a party is entitled is the specific redress 
or remedy that the court determines the party should receive in the litigation, or with respect to a 
claim for relief in the litigation." Id. "The court cannot grant a judgment as to one element of a 
claim for relief." Mosel/ Equities, LLC v. Berryhill & Co., Inc., 154 Idaho 269, 278, 297 P.3d 
232,241 (2013). 
Sometimes, the parties will argue issues that could be a claim for relief, but were not 
raised in the pleadings. If it is not raised in the pleadings, it is not a claim for relief, with the 
caveat that issues tried with the express or implied consent of the parties are treated as if they 
had been raised in the pleadings. I.R.C.P. 15(b). A judgment that purports to grant relief as to 
an issue not raised in the pleadings does not comply with Rule 54(a). 
"A document does not constitute a judgment merely because it states who will prevail in 
the lawsuit." Harrison, 149 Idaho at 205, 233 P.3d at 136. Thus, a document titled "Judgment" 
did not constitute a judgment where it merely stated, "The Court hereby enters Judgment against 
[Plaintiffs] in favor of Defendants." Id. "Although the document stated that the court 'hereby 
enters Judgment against [Plaintiffs] in favor of Defendants,' nowhere does it state what relief 
was either granted the Defendants or denied the [Plaintiffs]." Id. 
(d) A request for an award of attorney fees is not a claim for relief. Rule 54(a) states 
that if a judgment is not certified as final under Rule 54(b), there is no final judgment until 
judgment has been entered on all claims for relief, "except costs and fees." A request for an 
award of attorney fees and/or costs is not a claim for relief. "It shall not be necessary for any 
party in a civil action to assert a claim for attorney fees in any pleading .... " I.R.C.P. 54(e)(4); 
accord Eighteen Mile Ranch LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 720-21 
117 P.3d 130, 134-35 (2005). An assertion that a party is entitled to an award of attorney fees in 
a civil action is not a cause of action or claim for relief because attorney fees are simply costs 
awarded to the prevailing party in the litigation. Estate of Holland, 153 Idaho at 100-01, 279 
5 
APPENDIX A - PAGE 005 
P3d. at 86-87; accord Harrison, 149 Idaho at 206 n.l, 233 PJd at 137 (2010) ("Because there is 
no cause of action to recover court costs or attorney fees incurred in defending this lawsuit, any 
right to recover court costs or attorney fees is not a claim for relief."). 
The wording "except costs and fees" was added because many attorneys assert the 
entitlement to an award of attorney fees as a separate "claim for relief' or "cause of action" in a 
pleading. When that is done, there may be confusion as to whether a judgment has been entered 
on all "claims for relief' and is therefore a final judgment. The exception was added to avoid 
such confusion. 
(e) A Judgment Shall Not Contain. The prior version of Rule 54(a) stated, "A 
judgment shall not contain a recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior 
proceedings." The 2010 amendment added "the court's legal reasoning, findings of fact, or 
conclusions of law" to that list in order to make it clearer that a judgment cannot include the 
court's legal reasoning, findings of fact, or conclusions of law. That requirement is a corollary to 
the separate-document requirement. 
In 1963, the separate-document requirement was added to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 58(a) to require "that there be a judgment set out on a separate document--distinct 
from any opinion or memorandum-which provides the basis for the entry of judgment." Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 58(a) Advisory Committee Notes, 1963 Amendment. The separate-document 
requirement was added to Rule 58(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure in 1992. Hunting, 
129 Idaho at 637, 931 P.2d at 631. In Hunting, an order granting the defendant's motion for 
summary judgment included a statement that the plaintiff's complaint was dismissed with 
prejudice. This Court held that such order was not a judgment because it violated the separate-
document requirement. Id. Implicit in that holding was the requirement that a judgment cannot 
include the court's reasoning and legal analysis for entering the judgment. 
The requirement that a judgment likewise cannot include the court's findings of fact and 
conclusions of law is implicit in Rule 52(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule 
begins, "In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall 
find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon and direct the entry of 
the appropriate judgment .... " I.R.C.P. 52(a) (emphasis added). After finding the facts and 
stating the conclusions of law, the court is then to direct the entry of the appropriate judgment. 
6 
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A document titled '· Judgment of Dismissal with Prejudice" was not a judgment because it 
included a recital of the pleadings ("This action was started on January 26, 2010, with Plaintiffs' 
filing of a Civil Complaint") and a record of prior proceedings ("a list of the various motions 
presented to the district court, the dates of the hearings on those motions, and the court's rulings 
on the motions"). Estate of Holland, 153 Idaho at 99,279 PJd at 85. After the Supreme Court 
sent out an order conditionally dismissing the appeal for lack of a final judgment, the district 
court entered a purported amended judgment, which likewise did not comply with Rule 54(a) 
because it also included a record of prior proceedings, including the Supreme Court's order 
conditionally dismissing the appeal. Id. "[MJerely typing 'It is so ordered' at the end of a 
memorandum decision does not constitute a judgment. The judgment must be a separate 
document that does not contain the trial court's legal reasoning or analysis." Spokane Structures, 
148 Idaho at 620, 226 P.3d at 1267. In Bald, Fat & Ugly, LLC, an order confirming an 
arbitration award did not constitute a judgment because it contained a record of prior proceedings 
comprised of various documents that were attached to it consisting of "copies of the parties' 
mediated settlement agreement, their agreement to submit this matter to arbitration, the 
arbitrator's decision and awards, and a letter from the arbitrator responding to the Keanes' 
request for clarification of Award No. 2." Id. at 809', 303 P.3d at 168. 
3. Change in Rule 54(a) in 2014. Effective July 1, 2014, two additional changes were 
made to the Rule. Rule 54(a) provides as follows: 
"Judgment" as used in these rules means a separate document entitled 
"Judgment" or "Decree". A judgment shall state the relief to which a party is 
entitled on one or more claims for relief in the action. Such relief can include 
dismissal with or without prejudice. A judgment shall not contain a recital of 
pleadings, the report of a master, the record of prior proceedings, the court's legal 
reasoning, findings of fact, or conclusions of law. A judgment is final if either it 
has been certified as final pursuant to subsection (b )(1) of this rule or judgment 
has been entered on all claims for relief, except costs and fees, asserted by or 
against all parties in the action. A judgment shall begin with the words 
"JUDGtvtENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: ... ," and it shall not contain any 
other wording between those words and the caption. A judgment can include any 
findings of fact or conclusions of law expressly required by statute, rule, or 
regulation. 
The first change was to eliminate confusion caused by some judges. As stated above, a 
judgment cannot include a record of prior proceedings. Trial judges were initially informed that 
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they could have a short lead-in such as, "Based upon the jury verdict," or ''Based upon the 
court's memorandum decision," or "Based upon the order granting the plaintiffs motion for 
summary judgment." However, some trial judges could not restrain themselves to such short 
lead-ins, and they would list six or eight orders and decisions they had entered during the course 
of the proceedings that they believed were important in reaching their final decision. Then, the 
issue would become how many prior orders and decisions could be listed without the list 
becoming a record of prior proceedings. In order to avoid confusion, Rule 54(a) was amended to 
add the requirement, "A judgment shall begin with the words 'JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS 
FOLLOWS: ... ,' and it shall not contain any other wording between those words and the 
caption." Thus, following the caption, the document must begin, "JUDGMENT IS ENTERED 
AS FOLLOWS:." There can be no words between the caption and those words. In addition, the 
judgment must begin with those words. Experience has shown that unless it is expressly spelled 
out exactly what is permitted, those preparing purported judgments will use a variety of wording, 
some of which are quite lengthy. The intent is to make it crystal clear so that others, including 
court clerks, will know whether a document complies with Rule 54(a) and so that documents that 
do not comply can be identified as soon as possible. 
The second change was the addition of the statement, "A judgment can include any 
findings of fact or conclusions of law expressly required by statute, rule, or regulation." The 
reason for that change is that in some types of cases there are requirements imposed by statute, 
rule, or regulation that certain factual findings be stated in the judgment. Note, however, that 
such a requirement must be expressly required. 
B. CONSEQUENCES OF FAILING TO FOLLOW RULE 54(a). 
As shown above, the change to Rule 54(a) in 2010 was not significant because it 
essentially incorporated into Rule 54(a) requirements that already existed in other rules. The 
biggest change was the Supreme Court requiring that trial judges enter judgments that actually 
complied with the rules. Trial judges are ultimately responsible for issuing judgments that 
comply with the rules, even if they delegate the drafting of the judgments to counsel. Changing 
the legal culture has been much more difficult than clarifying what constitutes a judgment by 
amending Rule 54(a). In 2010, the Clerk of the Supreme Court estimated that about 80% of the 
civil cases that were appealed to the Supreme Court did not have purported judgments that 
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complied with Rule 54(a). Four years later, the clerk estimates that 60-70% of the appeals in 
civil cases do not have a judgment that complies with Rule 54(a). In those cases, an order is 
issued by the Clerk stating that the appeal will be dismissed without prejudice unless within a 
specified time period the trial court enters a judgment that complies with Rule 54(a). That 
procedure has not always resulted in such a judgment actually being entered. 
For example, there was a district court lawsuit in which there was a complaint and 
counterclaim, both alleging that the opposing party breached a written contract. On the day of 
trial, the parties reached a settlement that they orally placed on the record. The settlement 
consisted of a new contract between the parties and dismissal of the complaint and counterclaim. 
The parties later disagreed as to all of the terms of the new contract, and the plaintiffs filed a 
motion to have the district court determine those terms. After briefing and argument, the district 
court issued an order setting forth what it found to be the terms of the parties' new contract. It 
titled the document "Final Order," and it included in the document the statement, "This case is 
now final and closed, subject to reopening in the event the parties violate the above Order." The 
defendants appealed, contending that the court had included in the new contract a term upon 
which they had not agreed. The document did not constitute a judgment because: (a) it was not 
titled "Judgment" or "Decree"; (b) it did not resolve any claims in the lawsuit (the pleadings had 
not been amended to allege any claim related to the parties' new contract); and (c) the trial court 
purported to retain jurisdiction to resolve future disputes between the parties. The Supreme 
Court issued an order stating why the document did not constitute a judgment and ordering that 
the appeal would be dismissed without prejudice unless a judgment that complied with Rule 
54(a) was entered within 35 days. The district court did nothing further, and the appeal was 
dismissed without prejudice. Eventually the district court entered an "Amended Final Order," 
which was identical to the "Final Order," with two changes: (a) the district court deleted the 
sentence purporting to retain jurisdiction and (b) the court added a Rule 54(b) certificate. The 
defendants appealed again. The Supreme Court again issued an order stating that there was still 
no final judgment because: (a) attaching a Rule 54(b) certificate did not create a judgment; (b) 
the Amended Final Order did not resolve any of the claims set forth in the pleadings; and (c) the 
Amended Final Order did not comply with Rule 54(a) because it included a record of prior 
proceedings and the district court's findings of fact. The Supreme Court ordered that the appeal 
would be dismissed unless within 28 days a final judgment conforming to Rule 54(a) was 
9 
APPENDIX A - PAGE 009 
entered. The district court responded in writing: "The judgment entered was a stipulated 
judgment. Neither party proposed a different judgment after your order conditionally dismissing 
the appeal." The district court did nothing else, and the appeal was again dismissed \.\'ithout 
prejudice. After the appeal was dismissed, the district court entered a "Judgment of Dismissal" 
which stated, '"IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that all of Plaintiffs' claims and Counterclaimants' 
counterclaims are dismissed with prejudice." 
Another consequence of failing to comply with Rule 54(a) is that the document thought 
to be a final judgment is in reality only an interlocutory order. In Doe v. Doe, 155 Idaho 660, 
315 P.3d 848 (2013), the magistrate judge entered an order granting a petition to terminate the 
parental rights of the biological father of a child born out of wedlock and an order granting the 
maternal grandmother's petition to adopt that child. Id. at 661, 315 P.3d at 849. When the 
biological father learned of what had occurred, he filed a motion for relief under Rule 60(b) of 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 662, 315 P.3d at 850. The magistrate granted the 
motion and set aside the order, and the grandmother appealed. Id. at 663, 315 P.3d at 851. The 
Supreme Court gave notice that the appeal would be dismissed because the initial order did not 
comply with Rule 54(a) and was therefore not a judgment. Id. Since it was not a judgment, the 
order setting it aside was not appealable as an order entered after judgment. Id. In response, the 
magistrate entered a document titled "JUDGMENT," which merely restated that the initial order 
was set aside. Id Because a document setting aside an interlocutory order is not a judgment, the 
purported judgment which merely confirmed the setting aside of the interlocutory order was not 
a judgment, and the appeal was dismissed. Id. at 664, 315 P .3d at 852. After conferring with 
both counsel, the magistrate entered a judgment denying the grandmother any relief on her 
petition, and she appealed again. Id. On appeal, she did not challenge the dismissal of her 
petition because she had agreed to that form of judgment in the hope of being able to challenge 
the grant of relief under Rule 60(b). The Supreme Court held that the order terminating the 
biological father's parental rights and granting the petition to adopt was not a final judgment 
because it did not comply with Rule 54(a); that Rule 60(b) therefore did not apply; that the initial 
order was merely an interlocutory order; and that the correct standard for setting it aside was an 
abuse of discretion rather than the standard under Rule 60(b ). Id. at 664-65, 315 P.3d at 852-53. 
The Court also held that the final judgment ultimately entered was a denial on the merits of the 
petition for termination and adoption. Id. at 666, 315 P .3d at 854. 
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C. WHAT MUST ONE DO TO PREPARE A JUDGMENT? 
Preparing a judgment that complies with Rule 54(a) is easier than preparing one that does 
not comply with that rule. Compliance with Rule 54(a) is neither burdensome nor complicated, 
but it is a necessary step to providing all parties in a civil suit with finality of their claims at the 
trial court level, following an often lengthy period of court filings. 
A judgment must be a separate document titled "Judgment" or "Decree." It must begin, 
"JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:." Do not include any recitation as to the 
proceedings in the lawsuit. Simply creating a template that complies with these requirements 
and using it to prepare judgments would be helpful. 
A judgment must state the relief granted as to one or more claims for relief raised in the 
pleadings. Before drafting the relief granted, it may be helpful to review the pleadings. 
Sometimes, the parties argue claims for relief that were not raised in the pleadings. That 
typically occurs in connection with a motion for summary judgment. However, "a cause of 
action not raised in a party's pleadings may not be considered on summary judgment." Beco 
Const. Co., Inc. v. City of Idaho Falls, 124 Idaho 859, 865, 865 P.2d 950, 956 (1993). Therefore, 
a judgment cannot grant relief as to a claim that was not raised in the pleadings even if it was 
argued in connection with a motion for summary judgment. At other times, claims for relief are 
overlooked because they were alleged but not argued. 
After determining the claim(s) for relief, then simply state the relief that is granted as to 
each claim. The relief could be something such as, "the plaintiffs complaint is dismissed with 
prejudice"; "the plaintiff shall recover from the defendant the sum of $30,000"; or "counts one 
through three of the plaintiffs complaint are dismissed with prejudice." If there are claims 
asserted by different parties, simply list the relief granted as to each parties' claims. For 
example: 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
(a) The plaintiff shall recover from the defendant the sum of $30,000. 
(b) The defendant's counterclaim is dismissed with prejudice. 
( c) The defendant shall recover from the third-party defendant the sum of $30,000. 
Naming the parties when stating the relief granted is certainly permissible, and it should be done 
if necessary to avoid confusion as to what relief was granted for or against specific parties. 
l} 
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Unless expressly required by a statute, rule, or regulation, a judgment cannot include a 
recital of any findings of fact or conclusions of law. It also cannot include a recital of pleadings, 
the report of a master, the record of prior proceedings, or the court's legal reasoning. 
D. WHEN IS A JUDGl\-lENT A FINAL JUDGMENT. 
Rule 54(a) states, "A judgment is final if either it has been certified as final pursuant to 
subsection (b )(1) of this rule or judgment has been entered on all claims for relief, except costs 
and fees, asserted by or against all parties in the action." 
(a) Judgment has been entered on all claims for relief. Ordinarily, there is no final 
judgment until a judgment has been entered on all claims for relief in the action. Taylor v. 
Chamberlain, 154 Idaho 695, 697, 302 P.3d 35, 37 (2013) ("Because the partial judgment was 
not yet final due to the fact that there was no judgment resolving the claims against the 
remaining defendants, this Court issued a notice that the appeal would be dismissed."). If there 
is more than one claim for relief alleged in a lawsuit, there is no requirement that a single 
judgment be entered with respect to all of the claims. During the course of the proceedings, 
partial judgments may be entered on specific claims, and those judgments would then become 
final judgments once a judgment was entered on the last remaining claim. Camp, 137 Idaho at 
868, 55 P.3d at 322 ("Although the partial judgments previously entered by the district court 
resolved counts one, two, four, and five of the second amended complaint and the counterclaims, 
there was no final judgment until a judgment was entered resolving count three of the second 
amended complaint."). 
(b) Rule 54(b) certificate. Rule 54(a) provides that a "judgment is final if ... it has been 
certified as final pursuant to subsection (b)(l) of this rule." Rule 54(b) allows a trial court to 
make a partial judgment a final judgment when "more than one claim for relief is presented in an 
action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third party claim, or when multiple 
parties are involved." It does not cure a failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 54(a). 
A document must constitute a judgment under Rule 54(a) before it can be certified as a 
final judgment under Rule 54(b). Watson v. Weick, 141 Idaho 500, 505, 112 P.3d 788, 793 
(2005) (Rule 54(b) does not apply to an order granting summary judgment). Rule 54(b) does not 
apply to documents that resolve part of a claim. Rule 54(b) does not apply to a decision 
resolving part of a cause of action. Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841, 844-45, 908 P.2d 143, 146-47 
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(1995) (some but not all theories of liability regarding one cause of action); Twin Falls Cnty. v. 
Knievel, 98 Idaho 321, 323, 563 P.2d 45, 47 (1977) (liability but not damages); Glacier Gen. 
Assur. Co. v. Hisaw, 103 Idaho 605, 608, 651 P.2d 539, 542 (1982) (insurer's liability under 
insurance contract, but not damages; insurer's action for declaratory judgment that there is no 
coverage and insured's counterclaim for damages under the policy were one claim under Rule 
54(b)). Rule 54(b) does not apply to a decision dismissing an affirmative defense. Idaho Dept. 
of Labor v. Sunset Marts, Inc., 140 Idaho 207,210, 91 P.3d 1111, 1114 (2004) ("Rule 54(b) does 
not provide for certifying as final a partial judgment dismissing a defense."). Rule 54(b) does 
not apply to an order denying summary judgment. Merritt v. State, 113 Idaho 142, 143, 742 P.2d 
397, 398 (1986) (denial of the state's motion for summary judgment in an action for inverse 
condemnation, which implicitly held that a taking had occurred). 
Some trial judges seem to believe that a Rule 54(b) certificate will cure any failure to 
comply with Rule 54(a). It will not do so. As mentioned above, when faced with a dismissal for 
the failure of a purported judgment to meet specific requirements, a trial judge corrected one of 
the specified errors and then attached a Rule 54(b) certificate, apparently believing that it would 
cure the other failures. That judge was not the only one who has done so. This Court has also 
seen a judgment that dismissed all of the claims in the lawsuit, to which the trial court added a 
Rule 54(b) certificate, apparently thinking that it would cure any problems with Rule 54(a). 
E. CONCLUSION. 
Complying with Rule 54(a) is simple and easy. The only difficulty comes from changing 
the way it has always been done. The failure to comply with the rule will mean that what was 
thought to be a judgment is merely an interlocutory order, which can have significant 
consequences for the client. 
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What Is A Judgment? 
A. WHAT IS A JUDGMENT? 
Hon. Daniel T. Eismann 
August 13, 2014 
1. Prior to 2010. In 2009, the rules that set forth the requirements for a judgment were 
Rules 54(a) and (c) and 58(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 54(a) stated: 
"'Judgment' as used in these rules includes a decree and any order from which an appeal lies. A 
judgment shall not contain a recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior 
proceedings." Rule 54(c) included the requirement that "every final judgment shall grant the 
relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled." Rule 58(a) included the 
statement, "Every judgment shall be set forth on a separate document." 
The Idaho Supreme Court has, in the past, contributed to the confusion of what 
constitutes a judgment. For example, in Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637, 991 P.2d 362 (1999), 
the Court held that an order granting the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment was a final 
judgment because if an order "ends the suit, adjudicates the subject matter of the controversy, 
and represents a final determination of the rights of the parties, the instrument constitutes a final 
judgment." Id. at 640-41, 991 P.2d at 365-66. However, the Court had earlier held that an order 
granting a motion for summary judgment which stated that "[p ]laintiff' s complaint is dismissed 
with prejudice" was not a judgment because it did not comply with the separate-document 
requirement of Rule 58(a). Hunting v. Clark Cnty. School Dist. No. I 61, 129 Idaho 634, 637, 
931 P.2d 628, 631 (1997). In addition, in Davis, the Court held that the order granting the 
plaintiffs' motion for summary was a final judgment, even though the trial court did not 
expressly dismiss or rule upon the defendant's counterclaim, because all issues raised in the 
counterclaim were resolved by the grant of summary judgment to the plaintiffs. 133 Idaho at 
640-41, 991 P.2d at 365-66. In Skaggs v. Afutual of Enumclaw Insurance Co., 141 Idaho 114, 
I 06 P.3d 440 (2005), the Court held that a five-page "Decision and Order" which concluded with 
the words "It is so ordered" was a final judgment. In those cases, the Court focused upon 
whether it was clear that the district court's decision resolved all of the issues in dispute rather 
than whether the document complied with Rules 54(a) and (c) and 58(a). 
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Focusing solely upon whether the trial court had rendered a decision that, when 
examined, will resolve the issues in the case can lead to confusion as to the time limit for filing 
motions that must be filed within a specified time after the entry of judgment or for filing an 
appeal. For example, in Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co., Ltd., 137 Idaho 850, 55 P.3d 304 (2002), 
the district court orally granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment during a hearing 
held on November 16, 1999. Id. at 855, 55 P.3d at 309. Partial judgments had already been 
entered on all of the other claims for relief in the lawsuit. Id. at 867-68, 55 P.3d at 320-21. At 
the conclusion of the hearing, the court instructed defendant's counsel to prepare the appropriate 
order and a judgment. Id. at 868 n.12, 55 P.3d at 322. Defendant's counsel prepared the order, 
which was filed on November 24, 1999, and he filed a memorandum of costs on December 8, 
1999. Id. at 866, 55 P.3d at 320. After an objection that the memorandum did not comply with 
Rule 54(d)(5), he filed an amended memorandum of costs on December 22, 1999, which the 
district court held was untimely because it was not filed within fourteen days of the entry of the 
judgment (the order granting summary judgment). Id. Thus, the district court told counsel to 
prepare both an order granting the motion for summary judgment and a judgment. Counsel only 
prepared the order, and the court later held that the order constituted the judgment. This is an 
example of the confusion that can be created without a clear definition of what constitutes a 
judgment. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the memorandum of costs was not untimely 
because the order granting summary judgment was not a judgment. Id. at 868, 55 P.3d at 322. 
2. Change in Rule 54(a) in 2010. In 2010, the Court amended Rule 54(a) to clarify 
what constituted a judgment. The Rule that became effective on July 1, 2010, provided as 
follows: 
"Judgment" as used in these rules means a separate document entitled 
"Judgment" or "Decree". A judgment shall state the relief to which a party is 
entitled on one or more claims for relief in the action. Such relief can include 
dismissal with or without prejudice. A judgment shall not contain a recital of 
pleadings, the report of a master, the record of prior proceedings, the court's legal 
reasoning, findings of fact, or conclusions of law. A judgment is final if either it 
has been certified as final pursuant to subsection (b)(l) of this rule or judgment 
has been entered on all claims for relief, except costs and fees, asserted by or 
against all parties in the action. 
The rule set forth these requirements for a document to be a judgment. 
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(a) A judgment must be a separate document. A judgment must be a "separate 
document." The separate-document requirement was not new. Rule 58(a) already stated, "Every 
judgment shall be set forth on a separate document." That requirement had been added to Rule 
58(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure in 1992. Hunting, 129 Idaho at 637, 931 P.2d at 631. 
The 2010 amendment to Rule 54(a) took the separate-document requirement from Rule 
58(a) and incorporated it in Rule 54(a) in order to have all the requirements for a judgment in 
one rule. "The purpose of this rule is to eliminate confusion about when the clock for an appeal 
begins to run. The separate document requirement was also designed to eliminate uncertainty 
over what actions of the district court are intended to be its judgment." Spokane Structures, Inc. 
v. Equitable Inv., LLC, 148 Idaho 616,619,226 P.3d 1263, 1266 (2010) (quoting 46 Am. Jur. 2d 
Judgments § 70 (2006) (footnotes omitted)). 
For the judgment to be a separate document, the document must do only one thing-set 
forth the judgment to be entered. A document that begins with the court's decision granting the 
Defendant's motion for summary judgment and concludes with the words "Plaintiff's complaint 
is dismissed with prejudice" is not a judgment because the words dismissing the complaint were 
not on a separate document. Hunting, 129 Idaho at 637, 931 P.2d at 631. A document titled 
"Amended Judgment of Dismissal with Prejudice" was not a separate document as required by 
Rule 54(a), and therefore not a judgment, where the document included an order denying the 
Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration. Estate of Holland v. Metro. Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co., 153 
Idaho 94, 99, 279 P.3d 80, 85 (2012). In Bald, Fat & Ugly, LLC v. Keane, 154 Idaho 807, 303 
P.3d 166 (2013), an order confirming an arbitration award did not constitute a judgment because 
of the documents attached to it. "As this Court had previously explained, the separate-document 
requirement prohibits combining a judgment with a decision or order, including an order upon 
which the judgment is based." Id. at 809, 303 P.3d at 168. 
That should not be read as precluding attachments to a judgment. It depends upon what 
the attachments are. As explained below, the attachments cannot be documents that contain 
anything that cannot be included in a judgment, such as a recital of pleadings, the report of a 
master, the record of prior proceedings, the court's legal reasoning, findings of fact, or 
conclusions of law. However, other documents could be attached such as a legal description of 
the property in a judgment in a quiet title action or the list of property awarded to a party in a 
divorce action. 
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(b) A judgment must be titled "Judgment" or "Decree." To be a judgment, 
the document must be titled "Judgment" or "Decree." The purpose of this requirement is to 
make it clear that the document is a judgment. A document titled "ORDER TERMINATING 
PARENTAL RIGHTS AND GRANTING ADOPTION OF MINOR CHILD" could not 
constitute a judgment because it was not titled "Judgment" or "Decree." Doe v. Doe, 155 Idaho 
660,663,315 P.3d 848,851 (2013). However, merely titling a document "Judgment" will not 
make it a judgment if it does not otherwise comply with Rule 54(a). Harrison v. Certain 
Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 149 Idaho 201,205,233 P.3d 132, 136 (2010). 
The title need not be limited to the words "Judgment" or "Decree." For example, a 
document titled "Amended Judgment" would comply with the rule. However, the Supreme 
Court has not had occasion to address the scope of this requirement. It would not be prudent to 
have a title such as, "Judgment Based Upon the Granting of the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment That Was Argued on March 14, 2014, and Decided By This Court By a Written 
Opinion Filed on April 8, 2014." Although that may seem like a ridiculous example, this Court 
has seen similarly ridiculous actions by judges seeking to circumvent other provisions of Rule 
54(a). 
(c) A Judgment Shall State The Relief. The requirement that a judgment must 
"state the relief to which a party is entitled on one or more claims for relief in the action" was 
already included in Rule 54( c ). That rule included the requirement that "every final judgment 
shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party 
had not demanded such relief in his pleadings." I.R.C.P. 54(c) (2009). That requirement was 
also incorporated in Rule 54(a) so that the latter rule would include all of the requirements of a 
judgment. 
The relief to which a party is entitled must be the relief to which the party is entitled in 
the lawsuit on a claim for relief. That is why an order granting summary judgment cannot 
constitute a judgment. "The granting of the motion for summary judgment is simply a 
procedural step towards the party obtaining that relief." Spokane Structures, 148 Idaho at 619, 
226 P.3d at 1266. "The relief to which a party is entitled is not the granting of a motion for 
summary judgment. The Rule refers to the relief to which the party is ultimately entitled in the 
lawsuit, or with respect to a claim in the lawsuit." Id. 
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The relief to which a party is entitled must be read in connection with Rule 8(a)(l) of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. That rule provides, "A pleading which sets forth a claim for 
relief ... shall contain ... (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 
entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself 
entitled." I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l). "The 'demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself 
entitled' obviously refers to the relief that the party seeks in the lawsuit." Spokane Structures, 
148 Idaho at 619, 226 P .3d at 1266. "The relief to which a party is entitled is the specific redress 
or remedy that the court determines the party should receive in the litigation, or \\<1th respect to a 
claim for relief in the litigation." Id. "The court cannot grant a judgment as to one element of a 
claim for relief." Mosell Equities, LLC v. Berryhill & Co., Inc., 154 Idaho 269, 278, 297 P.3d 
232,241 (2013). 
Sometimes, the parties will argue issues that could be a claim for relief, but were not 
raised in the pleadings. If it is not raised in the pleadings, it is not a claim for relief, with the 
caveat that issues tried with the express or implied consent of the parties are treated as if they 
had been raised in the pleadings. I.R.C.P. 15(b). A judgment that purports to grant relief as to 
an issue not raised in the pleadings does not comply with Rule 54(a). 
"A document does not constitute a judgment merely because it states who will prevail in 
the lawsuit." Harrison, 149 Idaho at 205, 233 P.3d at 136. Thus, a document titled "Judgment" 
did not constitute a judgment where it merely stated, "The Court hereby enters Judgment against 
[Plaintiffs] in favor of Defendants." Id. "Although the document stated that the court 'hereby 
enters Judgment against [Plaintiffs] in favor of Defendants,' nowhere does it state what relief 
was either granted the Defendants or denied the [Plaintiffs]." Id. 
(d) A request for an award of attorney fees is not a claim for relief. Rule 54(a) states 
that if a judgment is not certified as final under Rule 54(b), there is no final judgment until 
judgment has been entered on all claims for relief, "except costs and fees." A request for an 
award of attorney fees and/or costs is not a claim for relief. "It shall not be necessary for any 
party in a civil action to assert a claim for attorney fees in any pleading .... " I.R.C.P. 54(e)(4); 
accord Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 720-21 
117 P.3d 130, 134-35 (2005). An assertion that a party is entitled to an award of attorney fees in 
a civil action is not a cause of action or claim for relief because attorney fees are simply costs 
awarded to the prevailing party in the litigation. Estate of Holland, 153 Idaho at 100-01, 279 
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P3d. at 86-87; accord Harrison, 149 Idaho at 206 n.1, 233 P.3d at 137 (2010) {"Because there is 
no cause of action to recover court costs or attorney fees incurred in defending this lawsuit, any 
right to recover court costs or attorney fees is not a claim for relief."). 
The wording "except costs and fees" was added because many attorneys assert the 
entitlement to an award of attorney fees as a separate "claim for relief' or "cause of action" in a 
pleading. When that is done, there may be confusion as to whether a judgment has been entered 
on all "claims for relief' and is therefore a final judgment. The exception was added to avoid 
such confusion. 
(e) A Judgment Shall Not Contain. The prior version of Rule 54(a) stated, "A 
judgment shall not contain a recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior 
proceedings." The 2010 amendment added "the court's legal reasoning, findings of fact, or 
conclusions of law" to that list in order to make it clearer that a judgment cannot include the 
court's legal reasoning, findings of fact, or conclusions of law. That requirement is a corollary to 
the separate-document requirement. 
In 1963, the separate-document requirement was added to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 58(a) to require "that there be a judgment set out on a separate document--distinct 
from any opinion or memorandum-which provides the basis for the entry of judgment." Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 58(a) Advisory Committee Notes, 1963 Amendment. The separate-document 
requirement was added to Rule 58(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure in 1992. Hunting, 
129 Idaho at 637, 931 P.2d at 631. In Hunting, an order granting the defendant's motion for 
summary judgment included a statement that the plaintiff's complaint was dismissed with 
prejudice. This Court held that such order was not a judgment because it violated the separate-
document requirement. Id. Implicit in that holding was the requirement that a judgment cannot 
include the court's reasoning and legal analysis for entering the judgment. 
The requirement that a judgment likewise cannot include the court's findings of fact and 
conclusions of law is implicit in Rule 52(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule 
begins, "In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall 
find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon and direct the entry of 
the appropriate judgment .... " I.R.C.P. 52(a) (emphasis added). After finding the facts and 
stating the conclusions of law, the court is then to direct the entry of the appropriate judgment. 
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A document titled "Judgment of Dismissal with Prejudice" was not a judgment because it 
included a recital of the pleadings ("This action was started on January 26, 2010, with Plaintiffs' 
filing of a Civil Complaint") and a record of prior proceedings ("a list of the various motions 
presented to the district court, the dates of the hearings on those motions, and the court's rulings 
on the motions"). Estate of Holland, 153 Idaho at 99,279 P.3d at 85. After the Supreme Court 
sent out an order conditionally dismissing the appeal for lack of a final judgment, the district 
court entered a purported amended judgment, which likewise did not comply with Rule 54(a) 
because it also included a record of prior proceedings, including the Supreme Court's order 
conditionally dismissing the appeal. Id. "[M]erely typing 'It is so ordered' at the end of a 
memorandum decision does not constitute a judgment. The judgment must be a separate 
document that does not contain the trial court's legal reasoning or analysis." Spokane Structures, 
148 Idaho at 620, 226 P.3d at 1267. In Bald, Fat & Ugly, LLC, an order confirming an 
arbitration award did not constitute a judgment because it contained a record of prior proceedings 
comprised of various documents that were attached to it consisting of "copies of the parties' 
mediated settlement agreement, their agreement to submit this matter to arbitration, the 
arbitrator's decision and awards, and a letter from the arbitrator responding to the Keanes' 
request for clarification of Award No. 2." Id. at 809', 303 P.3d at 168. 
3. Change in Rule 54(a) in 2014. Effective July 1, 2014, two additional changes were 
made to the Rule. Rule 54(a) provides as follows: 
"Judgment" as used in these rules means a separate document entitled 
"Judgment" or "Decree". A judgment shall state the relief to which a party is 
entitled on one or more claims for relief in the action. Such relief can include 
dismissal with or without prejudice. A judgment shall not contain a recital of 
pleadings, the report of a master, the record of prior proceedings, the court's legal 
reasoning, findings of fact, or conclusions of law. A judgment is final if either it 
has been certified as final pursuant to subsection (b )( 1) of this rule or judgment 
has been entered on all claims for relief, except costs and tees, asserted by or 
against all parties in the action. A judgment shall begin with the words 
"JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: ... ," and it shall not contain any 
other wording between those words and the caption. A judgment can include any 
findings of fact or conclusions of law expressly required by statute, rule, or 
regulation. 
The first change was to eliminate confusion caused by some judges. As stated above, a 
judgment cannot include a record of prior proceedings. Trial judges were initially informed that 
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they could have a short lead-in such as, "Based upon the jury verdict," or "Based upon the 
court's memorandum decision," or "Based upon the order granting the plaintiffs motion for 
summary judgment." However, some trial judges could not restrain themselves to such short 
lead-ins, and they would list six or eight orders and decisions they had entered during the course 
of the proceedings that they believed were important in reaching their final decision. Then, the 
issue would become how many prior orders and decisions could be listed without the list 
becoming a record of prior proceedings. In order to avoid confusion, Rule 54(a) was amended to 
add the requirement, "A judgment shall begin with the words 'JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS 
FOLLOWS: ... ,' and it shall not contain any other wording between those words and the 
caption." Thus, following the caption, the document must begin, "JUDGMENT IS ENTERED 
AS FOLLOWS:." There can be no words between the caption and those words. In addition, the 
judgment must begin with those words. Experience has shown that unless it is expressly spelled 
out exactly what is permitted, those preparing purported judgments will use a variety of wording, 
some of which are quite lengthy. The intent is to make it crystal clear so that others, including 
court clerks, will know whether a document complies with Rule 54(a) and so that documents that 
do not comply can be identified as soon as possible. 
The second change was the addition of the statement, "A judgment can include any 
findings of fact or conclusions of law expressly required by statute, rule, or regulation." The 
reason for that change is that in some types of cases there are requirements imposed by statute, 
rule, or regulation that certain factual findings be stated in the judgment. Note, however, that 
such a requirement must be expressly required. 
B. CONSEQUENCES OF FAILING TO FOLLOW RULE 54(a). 
As shown above, the change to Rule 54(a) in 2010 was not significant because it 
essentially incorporated into Rule 54(a) requirements that already existed in other rules. The 
biggest change was the Supreme Court requiring that trial judges enter judgments that actually 
complied with the rules. Trial judges are ultimately responsible for issuing judgments that 
comply with the rules, even if they delegate the drafting of the judgments to counsel. Changing 
the legal culture has been much more difficult than clarifying what constitutes a judgment by 
amending Rule 54(a). In 2010, the Clerk of the Supreme Court estimated that about 80% of the 
civil cases that were appealed to the Supreme Court did not have purported judgments that 
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complied with Rule 54(a). Four years later, the clerk estimates that 60-70% of the appeals in 
civil cases do not have a judgment that complies with Rule 54(a). In those cases, an order is 
issued by the Clerk stating that the appeal will be dismissed without prejudice unless within a 
specified time period the trial court enters a judgment that complies with Rule 54(a). That 
procedure has not always resulted in such a judgment actually being entered. 
For example, there was a district court lawsuit in which there was a complaint and 
counterclaim, both alleging that the opposing party breached a written contract. On the day of 
trial, the parties reached a settlement that they orally placed on the record. The settlement 
consisted of a new contract between the parties and dismissal of the complaint and counterclaim. 
The parties later disagreed as to all of the terms of the new contract, and the plaintiffs filed a 
motion to have the district court determine those terms. After briefing and argument, the district 
court issued an order setting forth what it found to be the terms of the parties' new contract. It 
titled the document "Final Order," and it included in the document the statement, "This case is 
now final and closed, subject to reopening in the event the parties violate the above Order." The 
defendants appealed, contending that the court had included in the new contract a term upon 
which they had not agreed. The document did not constitute a judgment because: (a) it was not 
titled "Judgment" or "Decree"; (b) it did not resolve any claims in the lawsuit (the pleadings had 
not been amended to allege any claim related to the parties' new contract); and (c) the trial court 
purported to retain jurisdiction to resolve future disputes between the parties. The Supreme 
Court issued an order stating why the document did not constitute a judgment and ordering that 
the appeal would be dismissed without prejudice unless a judgment that complied with Rule 
54(a) was entered within 35 days. The district court did nothing further, and the appeal was 
dismissed without prejudice. Eventually the district court entered an "Amended Final Order," 
which was identical to the "Final Order," with two changes: (a) the district court deleted the 
sentence purporting to retain jurisdiction and (b) the court added a Rule 54(b) certificate. The 
defendants appealed again. The Supreme Court again issued an order stating that there was still 
no final judgment because: (a) attaching a Rule 54(b) certificate did not create a judgment; (b) 
the Amended Final Order did not resolve any of the claims set forth in the pleadings; and ( c) the 
Amended Final Order did not comply with Rule 54(a) because it included a record of prior 
proceedings and the district court's findings of fact. The Supreme Court ordered that the appeal 
would be dismissed unless within 28 days a final judgment conforming to Rule 54(a) was 
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entered. The district court responded in writing: "The judgment entered was a stipulated 
judgment. Neither party proposed a different judgment after your order conditionally dismissing 
the appeal." The district court did nothing else, and the appeal was again dismissed without 
prejudice. After the appeal was dismissed, the district court entered a "Judgment of Dismissal" 
which stated, "IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that all of Plaintiffs' claims and Counterclaimants' 
counterclaims are dismissed with prejudice." 
Another consequence of failing to comply with Rule 54(a) is that the document thought 
to be a final judgment is in reality only an interlocutory order. In Doe v. Doe, 155 Idaho 660, 
315 P.3d 848 (2013), the magistrate judge entered an order granting a petition to terminate the 
parental rights of the biological father of a child born out of wedlock and an order granting the 
maternal grandmother's petition to adopt that child. Id. at 661, 315 P.3d at 849. When the 
biological father learned of what had occurred, he filed a motion for relief under Rule 60(b) of 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 662, 315 P.3d at 850. The magistrate granted the 
motion and set aside the order, and the grandmother appealed. Id. at 663,315 P.3d at 851. The 
Supreme Court gave notice that the appeal would be dismissed because the initial order did not 
comply with Rule 54(a) and was therefore not a judgment. Id. Since it was not a judgment, the 
order setting it aside was not appealable as an order entered after judgment. Id. In response, the 
magistrate entered a document titled "JUDG~1ENT," which merely restated that the initial order 
was set aside. Id. Because a document setting aside an interlocutory order is not a judgment, the 
purported judgment which merely confirmed the setting aside of the interlocutory order was not 
a judgment, and the appeal was dismissed. Id. at 664, 315 P.3d at 852. After conferring with 
both counsel, the magistrate entered a judgment denying the grandmother any relief on her 
petition, and she appealed again. Id. On appeal, she did not challenge the dismissal of her 
petition because she had agreed to that form of judgment in the hope of being able to challenge 
the grant of relief under Rule 60(b ). The Supreme Court held that the order terminating the 
biological father's parental rights and granting the petition to adopt was not a final judgment 
because it did not comply with Rule 54(a); that Rule 60(b) therefore did not apply; that the initial 
order was merely an interlocutory order; and that the correct standard for setting it aside was an 
abuse of discretion rather than the standard under Rule 60(b). Id. at 664-65, 315 P.3d at 852-53. 
The Court also held that the final judgment ultimately entered was a denial on the merits of the 
petition for termination and adoption. Id. at 666, 315 P.3d at 854. 
10" 
APPENDIX A- PAGE 010 
C. WHAT MUST ONE DO TO PREPARE A JUDGMENT? 
Preparing a judgment that complies -with Rule 54(a) is easier than preparing one that does 
not comply with that rule. Compliance with Rule 54(a) is neither burdensome nor complicated, 
but it is a necessary step to providing all parties in a civil suit with finality of their claims at the 
trial court level, following an often lengthy period of court filings. 
A judgment must be a separate document titled "Judgment" or "Decree." It must begin, 
"JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:." Do not include any recitation as to the 
proceedings in the lawsuit. Simply creating a template that complies with these requirements 
and using it to prepare judgments would be helpful. 
A judgment must state the relief granted as to one or more claims for relief raised in the 
pleadings. Before drafting the relief granted, it may be helpful to review the pleadings. 
Sometimes, the parties argue claims for relief that were not raised in the pleadings. That 
typically occurs in connection with a motion for summary judgment. However, "a cause of 
action not raised in a party's pleadings may not be considered on summary judgment." Beco 
Const. Co., Inc. v. City of Idaho Falls, 124 Idaho 859, 865, 865 P.2d 950, 956 (1993). Therefore, 
a judgment cannot grant relief as to a claim that was not raised in the pleadings even if it was 
argued in connection with a motion for summary judgment. At other times, claims for relief are 
overlooked because they were alleged but not argued. 
After determining the claim(s) for relief, then simply state the relief that is granted as to 
each claim. The relief could be something such as, "the plaintiffs complaint is dismissed with 
prejudice"; "the plaintiff shall recover from the defendant the sum of $30,000"; or "counts one 
through three of the plaintiffs complaint are dismissed with prejudice." If there are claims 
asserted by different parties, simply list the relief granted as to each parties' claims. For 
example: 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
(a) The plaintiff shall recover from the defendant the sum of $30,000. 
(b) The defendant's counterclaim is dismissed with prejudice. 
( c) The defendant shall recover from the third-party defendant the sum of $30,000. 
Naming the parties when stating the relief granted is certainly permissible, and it should be done 
if necessary to avoid confusion as to what relief was granted for or against specific parties. 
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Unless expressly required by a statute, rule, or regulation, a judgment cannot include a 
recital of any findings of fact or conclusions of law. It also cannot include a recital of pleadings, 
the report of a master, the record of prior proceedings, or the court's legal reasoning. 
D. WHEN IS A JUDGMENT A FINAL JUDGMENT. 
Rule 54(a) states, "A judgment is final if either it has been certified as final pursuant to 
subsection (b )( 1) of this rule or judgment has been entered on all claims for relief, except costs 
and fees, asserted by or against all parties in the action." 
(a) Judgment has been entered on all claims for relief. Ordinarily, there is no final 
judgment until a judgment has been entered on all claims for relief in the action. Taylor v. 
Chamberlain, 154 Idaho 695, 697, 302 P.3d 35, 37 (2013) ("Because the partial judgment was 
not yet final due to the fact that there was no judgment resolving the claims against the 
remaining defendants, this Court issued a notice that the appeal would be dismissed."). If there 
is more than one claim for relief alleged in a lawsuit, there is no requirement that a single 
judgment be entered with respect to all of the claims. During the course of the proceedings, 
partial judgments may be entered on specific claims, and those judgments would then become 
final judgments once a judgment was entered on the last remaining claim. Camp, 137 Idaho at 
868, 55 P.3d at 322 ("Although the partial judgments previously entered by the district court 
resolved counts one, two, four, and five of the second amended complaint and the counterclaims, 
there was no final judgment until a judgment was entered resolving count three of the second 
amended complaint."). 
(b) Rule 54(b) certificate. Rule 54(a) provides that a "judgment is final if ... it has been 
certified as final pursuant to subsection (b)(l) of this rule." Rule 54(b) allows a trial court to 
make a partial judgment a final judgment when "more than one claim for relief is presented in an 
action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third party claim, or when multiple 
parties are involved." It does not cure a failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 54(a). 
A document must constitute a judgment under Rule 54(a) before it can be certified as a 
final judgment under Rule 54(b). Watson v. Weick, 141 Idaho 500, 505, 112 P.3d 788, 793 
(2005) (Rule 54(b) does not apply to an order granting summary judgment). Rule 54(b) does not 
apply to documents that resolve part of a claim. Rule 54(b) does not apply to a decision 
resolving part ofa cause of action. Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841, 844-45, 908 P.2d 143, 146-47 
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(1995) (some but not all theories of liability regarding one cause of action); Twin Falls Cnty. v. 
Knievel, 98 Idaho 321, 323, 563 P.2d 45, 47 (1977) (liability but not damages); Glacier Gen. 
Assur. Co. v. Hisaw, 103 Idaho 605, 608, 651 P.2d 539, 542 (1982) (insurer's liability under 
insurance contract, but not damages; insurer's action for declaratory judgment that there is no 
coverage and insured's counterclaim for damages under the policy were one claim under Rule 
54(b)). Rule 54(b) does not apply to a decision dismissing an affirmative defense. Idaho Dept. 
of Labor v. Sunset Marts, Inc., 140 Idaho 207, 210, 91 PJd 1111, 1114 (2004) ("Rule 54(b) does 
not provide for certifying as final a partial judgment dismissing a defense."). Rule 54(b) does 
not apply to an order denying summary judgment. Merritt v. State, 113 Idaho 142, 143, 742 P.2d 
397, 398 (1986) (denial of the state's motion for summary judgment in an action for inverse 
condemnation, which implicitly held that a taking had occurred). 
Some trial judges seem to believe that a Rule 54(b) certificate will cure any failure to 
comply with Rule 54(a). It will not do so. As mentioned above, when faced with a dismissal for 
the failure of a purported judgment to meet specific requirements, a trial judge corrected one of 
the specified errors and then attached a Rule 54(b) certificate, apparently believing that it would 
cure the other failures. That judge was not the only one who has done so. This Court has also 
seen a judgment that dismissed all of the claims in the lawsuit, to which the trial court added a 
Rule 54(b) certificate, apparently thinking that it would cure any problems with Rule 54(a). 
E. CONCLUSION. 
Complying with Rule 54(a) is simple and easy. The only difficulty comes from changing 
the way it has always been done. The failure to comply with the rule will mean that what was 
thought to be a judgment is merely an interlocutory order, which can have significant 
consequences for the client. 
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